



Corporate Social Responsibility in Zones of Conflict 
No. 18 
2013 
Hrsg. von Prof. Dr. Susanne Lütz 
 i 
 
© 2013 by the author(s) 
Papers on International Political Economy are working papers from the current research of the Center for 
International Political Economy at the Free University of Berlin.  They appear in irregular intervals and are available 




PIPE Working Papers 
 
Arbeitsstelle Internationale Politische Ökonomie 
Center for International Political Economy 
Freie Universität Berlin 




Tel. (+49-30) 838-56470 




Corporate Social Responsibility in Zones of Conflict 
 
PIPE Working Paper No. 18 / 2013 
Arbeitsstelle Internationale Politische Ökonomie, Berlin 
Center for International Political Economy, Berlin 
Hrsg. von Prof. Dr. Susanne Lütz 
 
23. Juli 2013 
Papers on International Political Economy 
ISSN 1869-4985 (Print) 
ISSN 1869-8468 (Internet) 
 
Sarah Rieper completed her Master of Arts in Political Science at the Free University of  Berlin. She holds a 
Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Leipzig and completed an exchange semester at 
Sciences Po Paris. In her studies she focused on International Relations and International Political Economy. Her 






Departing from the previous focus on negative involvements of business in the political economy of war 
and its role in fuelling or causing conflict, transnational corporations are increasingly expected to 
contribute to conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict peace building. This paper analyzes 
under which conditions transnational corporations contribute to peace and security in zones of conflict. 
The question is explored in the framework of a comparative case study of Shell’s engagement in Nigeria 
and BP’s engagement in Azerbaijan. It is argued that transnational civil society activism, company and 
production characteristics and the role of the host state are crucial determinants of corporate engagement 
towards peace and security. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The recent attack on a BP plc (BP) oil installation in Algeria in January 2013 tragically demonstrates that 
corporations increasingly operate in conflict-ridden and fragile environments (Ganson/Wennmann 2012: 
2). In such contexts, corporations rarely remain a neutral bystander, even when they operate in remote 
areas such as the Algerian desert. They become involved in conflict zones, often as a driver or target of 
violence. Since the end of the 1990s, the private sector, especially transnational corporations (TNCs)1, has 
received widespread attention for its involvement in the political economy of war and its role in fuelling or 
causing conflict. TNCs have contributed to violent conflict in different forms, be it by financing war 
parties, supporting repressive regimes, trading conflict goods or hiring aggressive private security forces 
(Banfield et al. 2003; Renner 2002; Watts 2005). In the recent past, however, TNCs have also become 
involved in conflict zones as agents of peace. Corporations like the South African diamond company De 
Beers, formerly known for its involvement in the trade of “conflict diamonds”, have participated in global 
initiatives to prevent or mitigate conflict, such as the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 
(VPs) and the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Moreover, TNCs increasingly include conflict 
prevention provisions in unilateral corporate social responsibility (CSR) schemes. 
1.1 Research question and relevance 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the conditions under which TNCs contribute to peace and security 
in zones of conflict. Accordingly, the research question is: Under which conditions do TNCs contribute to peace 
and security in zones of conflict? Through this focus, the thesis seeks to provide a better understanding of 
corporate engagement in conflict zones. It is further assumed that a comprehensive understanding of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of corporate engagement towards peace and security is essential in 
determining possible policy interventions that promote corporate contributions towards peace rather than 
conflict. More generally, the thesis aims to contribute to the wider discussion on global governance. As 
peace and security are generally perceived as a core responsibility of the state, they represent a “hard case” 
for governance with and without government. The insights gained on the conditions for corporate 
engagement in peace and security can thus prove applicable for other policy fields. Rooted in the CSR and 
global governance discussion, this thesis presumes that corporations can make valuable contributions to 
governance and, in particular, to peace and security under specific circumstances. While this focus has 
normative implications, the interest of this thesis is primarily analytical. 
1.2 State of the art 
There is a growing body of literature on business in violent conflict among which a large number of 
scholars focuses on the adverse effects TNCs have on conflict (e.g. Hook/Ganguly 2000; Swanson 2002). 
However, an emerging strand of literature now investigates potential contributions of corporations, 
specifically TNCs, to peace and security (Banfield et al. 2003; Ballentine/Nitzschke 2005b; 
Deitelhoff/Wolf 2010b; Wenger/Möckli 2003). While they lack a comprehensive theoretical approach and 
systematic (comparative) case studies (Wolf et al. 2007: 297-298), scholars have identified different factors 
for TNC contributions to peace and security. In empirical case studies, Deitelhoff and Wolf (2010b) find 
                                                 
1 TNCs are defined as „incorporated or unincorporated enterprises comprising parent enterprises and their foreign 
affiliates. A parent enterprise is defined as an enterprise that controls assets of other entities in countries other than 
its home country, usually by owning a certain equity capital stake” (UNCTAD 2012: n.p.). 
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company, production and conflict characteristics, as well as political and social environments in home and 
host states relevant explanatory variables. Specifically, case studies have isolated factors such as reputation 
sensitivity, pressure from civil society, home state engagement and host state capacity and willingness to 
implement regulations and provide public goods (Feil 2012; Wallbott 2010; Zimmer 2010). Conflict 
characteristics such proximity of violence, however, remain largely unexplored. 
In addition to the literature on the role of business in conflict, a growing body of literature on CSR and 
global governance in general provides valuable insights on the rationale and behavior of TNCs. Most 
research on corporate behavior has applied a rationalist framework. According to this approach, cost-
benefit calculations are the main drivers of action. Recent publications have argued, for example, that 
TNCs engage in CSR or global governance because they want to avoid regulation or gain competitive 
advantage on the market (Haufler 2001a; Vogel 2005). Furthermore, publications have highlighted the role 
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and consumer pressure, inducing both material and social 
costs (e.g. Spar/La Mure 2003). In the recent past, however, alternative approaches to TNC engagement 
originating from constructivist thinking have gained prominence. Scholars suggest that corporations are 
guided by social norms (Haufler 1999; Hofferberth et al. 2011; Rieth/Zimmer 2004a). In this vein, CSR 
policies are a result of new norms that redefine appropriate behavior for corporations with regard to social 
and environmental standards (Hofferberth et al. 2011: 215). 
1.3 Design and methodology  
The above mentioned research question is pursued in a comparative case study of two cases from the oil 
industry, namely Royal Dutch Shell plc’s (Shell) engagement in Nigeria and BP’s engagement in 
Azerbaijan. The design was chosen to account for the complexity of causal mechanisms and interaction 
effects. In zones of violent conflict, TNCs are subjected to complex local dynamics. At the same time, 
TNCs compete on global markets and engage with international stakeholders. An explanation of TNC 
engagement in such environments requires a qualitative, in-depth analysis. Moreover, the comparative 
design was selected to increase the number of observations (Hall 2003: 397; King et al. 1994: 217-218). 
The approach taken in this thesis is inspired by Stuart Mill’s “method of agreement” (Mill [1884]: 221-
223).2 Two cases with similar outcomes but different contexts are analyzed. While a selection on the 
dependent variable generally runs the risk of selection bias (King et al. 1994: 129-137), it can “serve the 
heuristic purpose of identifying the potential causal paths and variables leading to the dependent variable 
of interest” (George/Bennett 2005: 23) in emerging research areas like the above. In addition, such an 
approach can prove instrumental in evaluating necessary conditions (Dion 1998).  
The case study is structured by several hypotheses developed on the basis of the literature review on 
business and conflict as well as CSR and global governance in general. Considering the early stage of 
research on the subject and the lack of a comprehensive theoretical framework, the hypotheses serve as a 
guiding tool in the empirical analysis of causal mechanisms rather than a theory test. In addition, the case 
study pursues an inductive approach. The thesis is based on a thorough review of secondary literature on 
business in conflict, CSR, global governance and peace and conflict studies. Empirical findings in both 
cases are based on secondary literature, where available, as well as primary sources and “grey literature” 
from companies and their project partners, non-governmental and international and national 
governmental institutions as well as the media.  
                                                 
2 This approach is often referred to as “most different” design. However, as George and Bennett (2005: 165) point 
out, Mill’s approach originates from a comparison of the dependent variable while Przeworski’s and Teune’s “most 
different” design focuses on the independent variables. 
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1.4 Hypotheses and variables 
Based on the debate on business and conflict as well as CSR and global governance in general, several 
hypotheses are developed. The thesis accords particular interest to the role of stakeholders, such as 
governments, NGOs and communities, in shaping TNC engagement. It is expected that the dynamics of 
local actors play a significant role for TNC engagement in zones of violent conflict. Due to their 
transnational nature, TNCs are also part of international arenas that influence their actions. International 
stakeholders are therefore another focus of the analysis. The following hypotheses are put forward for 
subsequent testing and analysis:  
 
H1: Transnational civil society activism around security- and conflict-related issues directed at a company leads to corporate 
engagement towards peace and security in zones of conflict. 
 
H2: Medium host state capacity to implement governance unilaterally coupled with host state willingness to provide peace and 
security leads to corporate engagement towards peace and security. 
 
The influence of the conflict environment is another focus of the analysis. Based on Feil (2012) and 
Deitelhoff and Wolf (2010b), the following hypothesis is developed:  
 
H3: Conflict proximity leads to corporate engagement towards peace and security. 
 
The dependent variable to be analyzed is the engagement of TNCs with regard to peace and security in 
zones of conflict.3 Engagement comprises both commitments (output) and behavior (outcome) (Wolf et 
al. 2007: 296). According to Wolf et al. (2007: 304), TNCs can actively contribute to peace and security, 
withdraw from a conflict zone, conduct “business as usual” or take advantage of the lack of public 
regulation in zones of violent conflict. The possible values of the dependent variable, therefore, comprise 
active contributions to peace and security, “business as usual”, withdrawal and taking advantage of public 
regulation gaps. The specific research interest of this thesis lies in corporate contributions to peace and 
security. In line with the definition of the dependent variable, corporate contributions to peace and 
security are only observed on the output and outcome dimension. The impact dimension is not 
considered here as it poses great analytical hurdles, such as multi-causality and counterfactual reasoning 
(Deitelhoff/Wolf 2010a: 14). Based on Deitelhoff and Wolf (2010b), corporate contributions to peace and 
security are considered as governance, defined here as “the various institutionalized modes of social 
coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods“ 
(Börzel/Risse 2010: 114). Furthermore, they are characterized as voluntary initiatives and, therefore, 
constitute a part of CSR. These voluntary governance contributions directly or indirectly address peace 
and security in a narrow sense. Corporations, therefore, contribute to the prevention, mitigation or 
resolution of conflicts (Feil 2012: 7-8). Direct contributions to peace and security include, for instance, the 
provision of security to a broader community surrounding a company’s operations. Indirect contributions 
address peace and security through other policy fields, for example through policies that are relevant to 
the root causes of conflicts and de-escalation, or conflict-sensitive policies.  
                                                 
3 Conflict zones are broadly defined as geographical areas that are “in, emerging from or at risk of violent conflict” 
(Banfield et al. 2003: 15).  
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Independent variables of the analysis comprise transnational civil society activism around security- and 
conflict-related issues (H1), the host state capacity to implement governance unilaterally coupled with 
willingness to provide peace and security (H2) and the proximity of violence (H3). Indicators are discussed 
in the next chapter.  
1.5 Outline 
Following the introduction, the second section of the thesis provides an overview of research on business 
in zones of conflict. It begins with the context of “new wars” and “resource conflicts” and continues with 
the negative involvement of business in conflict. Before focusing on corporate contributions to peace and 
security, the section introduces global governance and CSR as a theoretical background. Then, potential 
factors for corporate engagement towards peace and security are analyzed by drawing on literature from 
business and conflict, CSR and global governance. In section three, the comparative case study on Shell’s 
engagement in the Niger Delta conflict and BP’s engagement in Azerbaijan is presented. In both cases, an 
overview of the conflict and the company provides the background information for the subsequent 
analysis of the companies’ engagement in the conflict environment and for the identification of factors 
explaining the companies’ contributions to peace and security. In addition, the hypotheses are tested. The 
next section discusses and compares the empirical findings, while the final section provides a conclusion 
to the research question and offers an outlook on future research and practical relevance. 
2. BUSINESS IN ZONES OF CONFLICT 
The role of business in conflict has only recently received attention in academic and policy circles. While 
research has previously focused on the link between business and conflict, an emerging strand of literature 
investigates the potential contributions of business to peace and security. The following sections review 
the existing research linking business to conflict and peace and, more generally, research on the shifting 
roles of business in order to contextualize and conceptualize corporate engagement towards peace and 
security and identify potential explanations.  
2.1 Linking business to conflict 
This section introduces the economic dimensions of violent conflict as a context for business operations. 
This serves to underline the relevance of corporate engagements towards peace and security. Moreover, 
the identification of mechanisms linking business to conflict offers points of departure for potential 
contributions to peace and security. 
2.1.1 Economic dimensions of conflict  
Much of the literature on business roles in conflict zones departs from the economic dimensions of 
contemporary conflict (e.g. Ballentine/Haufler 2005; Shankleman 2006). Since the end of the Cold War, a 
number of scholars have argued that the nature of violent conflict has changed significantly (Kaldor 1999; 
Münkler 2002). The emerging “new wars” differ from “old wars” with regard to their goals, financing 
mechanisms and methods of warfare (Kaldor 1999: 6). Arguments include that contemporary conflicts are 
predominantly intrastate, rather than interstate; characterized by state failure; and fought over ethnicity 
and religion (Newman 2004: 174-175). Moreover, economic dimensions are highlighted as key features of 
violent conflict, for example, in the form of globalized war economies or economic incentives for 
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violence. In the political economy of violent conflict, globalization is considered a crucial component. For 
the global South, market liberalization and deregulation have been accompanied by a weakening of state 
authority (Duffield 2000: 72; Jung 2003: 2) that gives rise to a privatization of violence (Kaldor 1999: 92). 
The lack of state authority leaves a variety of public and private actors to compete over control (Newman 
2004: 176). According to Kaldor (1999: 92), “the new wars are characterized by a multiplicity of types of 
fighting units both public and private, state and non-state, or some kind of mixture”. To fund their 
operations, the different types of combatants rely largely on global networks. While looting, robbery and 
extortion of the local population remain persistent in the majority of contemporary conflicts (Kaldor 
1999: 102), combatants increasingly finance their activities through regional and global illicit trade, 
diaspora networks, or assistance from foreign governments (Collier/Hoeffler 2004; Duffield 2000; Kaldor 
1999). Essentially, Duffield (2000) argues, globalization has facilitated the establishment and maintenance 
of war economies. Much of the literature argues that these war economies are not an expression of chaos, 
but follow a particular (economic) logic. Keen (1998: 11) suggests that “[w]ar is not simply a breakdown in 
a particular system, but a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection”.  
Natural resources have taken a prominent role in the literature on the economic dimensions of violent 
conflict. Scholars find that high-value, finite natural resources present financial opportunities for rebels 
and, therefore, fuel or prolong civil wars (e.g. Collier/Hoeffler 2004; Collier et al. 2004). The pillage and 
global trade of diamonds in the Sierra Leone civil war by the rebel group Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) serves as a prominent example (e.g. Renner 2002). Furthermore, it is argued that natural resources 
present a motive for violence (Berdal/Keen 1997; Collier 2000). Rebels “initiate violence not necessarily 
to overthrow a government, but to gain and maintain control over lucrative resources” (Renner 2002: 7). 
This train of thought has provoked an intense debate (e.g. Ballentine/Sherman 2003). Scholars criticize 
that the link between natural resources and violent conflict is not necessarily direct, but rather mediated by 
the adverse effects of natural resource wealth on socioeconomic development and political institutions 
and dependent on other conditions (Basedau 2005; Humphreys 2005). Literature on the “resource curse” 
describes detrimental effects of resource dependence on the economy and political institutions in detail. 
On the one hand, resource wealth is associated with poor economic growth (Auty 2001; Sachs/Warner 
1995) and the negative economic effects of the “Dutch Disease” (Corden/Neary 1982). On the other 
hand, resource rich countries are often rentier states, characterized by corruption, patronage and autocracy 
(Jensen/Wantchekon 2004; Yates 1996). These conditions are a source of conflict and create “permissive 
causes of violence and armed conflict” (Ballentine/Nitzschke 2005a: 3).  
Business actors in zones of conflict are part of the different economic dimensions of conflict in varying 
degrees, be it by sustaining globalized war economies or contributing to the “resource curse”. Often they 
are involved in fuelling conflict directly or indirectly. The following section explores the different 
mechanisms linking business, notably TNCs, with conflict. 
2.1.2 Links between business and conflict 
In the debate on the economic dimensions of violent conflict, the role of business actors has received 
increasing attention. Investigations by NGOs have turned the spotlight on the involvement of business 
actors in violent conflict by exposing corporate entanglements with war economies in Angola and Sierra 
Leone (Global Witness 1998; 1999; Smillie et al. 2000). The reports revealed, for instance, that the 
diamond company De Beers contributed to financing a brutal civil war by buying Angolan rough 
diamonds originating from rebel-controlled zones during the 1990s. Following a United Nations Security 
Council embargo on “unofficial” diamonds from Angola in 1998, diamonds were also smuggled out of the 
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country and sold illegally to Europe and other destinations (Global Witness 1998). This is only one of 
many examples of business involvement in violent conflicts, demonstrating in this case the interaction 
between local and global, as well as legal and illegal business spheres highlighted by the research on the 
economic dimensions of violent conflict.  
The various mechanisms linking business actors to conflict can be categorized along different types of 
business activities. A first distinction can be made “between companies whose legitimate business 
activities have negative but unintended effects on conflict dynamics, and those commercial actors […] 
who deliberatively seek to profit from war by conducting the – often illicit and always predatory – 
business of war” (Ballentine/Nitzschke 2004: 38). The latter type of business typically comprises the illegal 
sector of the global economy involved in money laundering and arms, drugs and human trafficking. 
Middlemen and brokers, such as the arms dealer Leonid Minin, contribute to conflicts by supplying 
governments or rebels in zones of conflict with weapons and other military equipment through illegal 
channels, sometimes in return for illicit goods, such as diamonds (Lallemand 2002; Van Niekerk 2002). 
Moreover, middlemen are key figures in facilitating the illegal trade with conflict commodities and drugs 
as in the civil wars of Sierra Leone and Colombia (Renner 2002). While they regularly cross “between the 
secretive worlds of war commerce, organized crime and terrorism” (Van Niekerk 2002: n.p.), they also 
maintain relations with the legal political and economic sphere. Other business actors seeking to profit 
from violent environments are “rogue companies”. They are usually small but often internationally 
operating companies that use conflict situations to cover up their operations or actively supply combatants 
(Taylor 2002). Their operations are often illegal, but in many cases they do not technically violate existing 
laws. As legitimate companies generally prefer stable operating environments, they are rarely associated 
with this type of business. However, there have been cases where otherwise legitimate companies have 
deliberately taken advantage of violent environments (Ballentine/Nitzschke 2004: 39).4  
The involvement of private security and military companies (PSMCs) in zones of conflict is a special case 
in point. Their business is generally legitimate but relates directly to war. PSMCs offer security services to 
public and private actors on the global market, from logistics, intelligence and training to combat. Since 
the end of the Cold War, the demand for PSMCs has increased steadily (Deitelhoff 2010: 179-180). Their 
role in conflict, however, remains ambivalent. While the provision of security constitutes the core business 
of PSMCs, they are also linked to war economies (Ganser 2004: 67).  
Aside from few exceptions and corporations whose business relates directly to war, legitimate business is 
generally linked to conflict through negative, but unintended effects. While there are various mechanisms 
through which local businesses can have negative, unintended effects on conflicts (e.g. International Alert 
2006: 25-26), the interest of this thesis lies with TNCs. Within the business-and-conflict agenda, TNCs 
were identified as a culprit and received widespread attention (Haufler 2010: 118). TNCs can contribute to 
conflicts at the micro level through their impact on local relationships or at the macro level through their 
impact on the economic, political and natural environments of the host state (Banfield et al. 2003: 18). 
Both levels are interconnected, and cannot be entirely separated. At the macro level, TNCs can fuel 
conflicts by supporting repressive governments through taxes and royalty payments (Taylor 2002: 33-34). 
When TNCs contribute to existing practices of corruption and bribery, they can further “reinforce the 
existing distribution of power and undermine the legitimacy of government” (Banfield et al. 2003: 21). 
Unequal distribution of benefits from foreign investment can become another source of grievance that 
                                                 
4 Legitimate businesses are those businesses „that are not criminal enterprises and that generally operate within the 
bounds of law“ (Haufler 2001b: 660). However, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate businesses cannot 
always be clearly drawn.  
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fuels conflicts (Banfield et al. 2003: 21, 23). The impact of TNC engagement on conflict at the macro level 
is multifaceted and complex. The boundaries between the responsibilities of state and corporations are 
sometimes blurred, especially when TNCs operate in undemocratic and non-functioning regulatory 
environments. 
At the micro level, corporate impacts on conflicts are more easily observed. Different corporate behavior 
has been identified to generate or fuel conflict at the local level. First, the operations of TNCs, especially 
in the extractive industries, can lead to environmental degradation and pollution of land and water. As a 
consequence, local communities are often faced with health problems, the destruction of their livelihoods 
and unemployment while benefits accrue mostly to elites (Renner 2002: 39-47). The lack of sufficient 
compensation on the part of TNCs can create additional grievances. Second, TNCs can give rise to 
conflict through their relationship with employees. Poor working conditions, human rights violations, or 
preferential employment of certain groups can provoke major disputes and reinforce existing conflicts 
(Banfield et al. 2003: 19). Third, TNC behavior is associated with conflict over land and resource access. 
Communities are sometimes relocated so that companies can build, expand and maintain their operations. 
Indigenous peoples, whose land rights are not formally recognized, are particularly affected from this 
practice (USAID 2004: 4). Conflicts can arise directly over the right or access to this land or insufficient 
compensation and community participation. Fourth, community relations can present a source of conflict, 
for instance, when TNCs cooperate with local elites or certain groups to the detriment of others (Banfield 
et al. 2003: 20). Finally, TNCs have been accused of severe human rights violations. When confronted 
with local resistance and conflict, TNCs often hire private or state security forces to protect both staff and 
company facilities. On various accounts, both private and public security forces guarding company 
premises have applied excessive force to suppress protests from local communities or workers (e.g. Beder 
2002; Human Rights Watch 1999). Indeed, companies were also involved in killings of protesters.  
Thanks to NGO activism and media publicity, the involvement of business in conflict received substantial 
attention beyond the scientific community. Against this background, a growing focus on corporate 
contributions to peace in zones of conflict has emerged. The international community has launched 
initiatives to curtail illegitimate business in conflict zones and increasingly expects legitimate business, 
notably TNCs, to actively contribute to peace. 
2.2 The shifting role of business and concepts of social engagement 
The discussion of business links with conflict reveals that corporations have negative effects on their 
immediate and wider operating environments. This applies not only to conflict and security issues but 
extends to other policy areas. The private sector has contributed to environmental degradation, 
corruption, poor working conditions and, most recently, the current global financial crisis (Watts 2005; 
Wolf/Schwindenhammer 2011: 10-11). These practices have provoked harsh criticism and fuelled fears of 
corporate domination (e.g. Korten 2001). At the same time, “the international community increasingly 
appears to view corporations as powerful partners in global governance” (Flohr et al. 2010: 7). Rather than 
being part of the problem, the private sector is expected to contribute to the solution (e.g. Ruggie 2002). It 
appears that the expectations of the social responsibilities of corporations have changed significantly over 
the past two decades so that corporations now engage in various areas from environmental protection to 
peace and security. As a preliminary step to the analysis of corporate contributions to peace and security, 
this section introduces global governance and CSR to illustrate the shifting roles of corporations, in 
particular TNCs, towards greater social responsibility and increasing participation in governance. 
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Furthermore, the concepts introduced here provide a theoretical background for the analytical framework 
developed in section 2.3.2.  
2.2.1 Global Governance 
The idea that corporations take on public roles in the framework of global governance is closely 
connected to the changing role of the state and emerging “governance deficits” in the context of 
globalization. Many scholars suggest that in the face of deepening globalization, the state has only limited 
authority (Mathews 1997; Reinicke 1997; Strange 1996). According to Gereffi and Mayer (2004: n.p.), 
“[c]ontemporary economic globalization has outstripped the capacity of national-level governmental and 
societal institutions to regulate markets and to compensate for their impacts”. As a result, “governance 
deficits” have emerged both at the international and domestic level (Gereffi/Mayer 2004), giving rise to 
the question of governance without government (Rosenau/Czempiel 1992). The concept of “global 
governance” developed in the course of the debate captures the shifting modes of governance apparent in 
the context of globalization, from predominantly hierarchical coordination through governments to 
complex interactions of both public and private actors on different levels and through various 
mechanisms including non-hierarchical forms of cooperation. Furthermore, the concept is discussed as an 
approach to tackle the apparent governance gaps.  
Originating from economics and political science, governance generally refers to “the various 
institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to 
provide collective goods“ (Börzel/Risse 2010: 114; similar Mayntz 2010: 37).5 Thus, it consists of both 
structure and process. With regard to actors and institutions, governance includes governments and non-
state actors such as corporations and NGOs. The term implicates that governments are not the only 
actors that can contribute to governance. It accounts for the various types of non-state actors that are 
involved in governance contributions, notably at the global level (Feil 2012: 33-34). Moreover, governance 
includes different modes of social coordination. Börzel and Risse (2010: 115), for example, differentiate 
between competition systems and hierarchical and non-hierarchical coordination such as negotiation 
systems and informal networks. For International Relations, the concept of governance emerging in the 
1990s thus offered several new points of departure. Research can now focus the analytical lens on the 
different actors and modes of coordination that characterize “new modes of governance”. There is, 
however also a normative dimension associated with the term. Ultimately, scholars argue, global 
governance is needed to adequately address the challenges posed by globalization (Messner 1999; Reinicke 
1997).   
Corporations represent one of the actors considered in global governance that have received increasing 
attention. Flohr et al. (2010: 7) note that “[l]ike the state and civil society, corporations are in the process 
of redefining their traditional roles, identities, and functions in the light of the growing regulatory 
demands to which they are exposed”. While corporations were primarily an object of regulation in the 
past, they increasingly act as regulators themselves, through co-regulation with state actors or private self-
regulation. Generally, the involvement of the private sector in governance is not a new phenomenon. 
Indeed, governments involved the private sector in governance a long time ago (e.g. Wolf 2010). 
Historically, the clear separation of the public and private sphere within the modern nation-state 
represents an exception to the rule rather than the norm (Deitelhoff/Wolf 2010a: 8). In the early modern 
                                                 
5 There are other, both wider and narrower definitions of governance. However, to avoid conceptual overstretch or a 
concept that captures only what some term „new modes of governance“, this thesis refers to a concept of medium-
reach (see Risse 2008: 150).  
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state, for instance, it was common for private actors to take on functions of the state, even in the realm of 
security (Wolf 2010). In contrast to the past, however, present private governance contributions represent 
less a delegation of authority but rather voluntary self-commitments in reaction to expectations of the 
public (Flohr et al. 2010: 13). Such commitments tend to be enforced by soft means, such as transparency, 
NGO pressure and self-commitment including corporate codes of conducts or written agreements among 
companies or between companies and other groups (Feil 2012: 35; Haufler 2001a: 8). Many raise questions 
about the voluntary nature and lack of accountability and legitimacy of such commitments (e.g. Cutler et 
al. 1999; Simons 2004). It is widely accepted that corporate governance contributions cannot and should 
not be a substitute for government regulation. Nevertheless, the private sector, in particular TNCs, is 
recognized as a valuable governance actor for several reasons. Companies often bring in financial 
resources that cannot easily be matched by other actors, such as NGOs. Furthermore, they tend to be 
equipped with high technical, organizational and human resources coupled with the ability to foster 
innovation and efficiency (Fuchs 2007: 10; Haufler 2010: 107).  
TNCs have received particular attention among governance by business actors, not only for their large 
resources but also for their crucial role in the global economy. TNCs represent a major force in the 
process of globalization that policymakers and NGOs need to take into account when addressing the 
negative effects of globalization. In the past 20 years alone, the number of TNCs has almost than tripled 
from 37,000 in the early 1990s to over 103,000 in 2010 (UNCTAD 1993: 2; UNCTAD 2011a: n.p.). 
Moreover, TNCs recently accounted for one quarter of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
(UNTAD 2011b: 25). Against the background of their increasing economic weight, TNCs have taken on 
active political roles. Through the participation in governance processes, TNCs have obtained increasing 
rule-setting power. Furthermore, TNCs have gained discursive power by participating in public debates on 
political problems and the definition of their own roles as social, economic and political actors (Fuchs 
2005: 772). While some authors caution against an exaggeration of TNC power (e.g. Fuchs 2007; Ganser 
2004: 60), it is apparent that TNCs are a force to be reckoned with in global governance. In addition to 
their obvious powerful presence in the economic and political realm, the interest in (Northern-based) 
TNCs can be attributed to the opportunities to influence their behavior (Banfield et al. 2003: 4). Feil 
(2012: 79) notes that Northern TNCs are more likely to be under civil society pressure and more 
absorbent to international norms and, therefore, exhibit characteristics that render them more likely to 
engage in governance. Similarly, Fuchs (2005) argues that the political role of TNCs depends on the public 
perception of their legitimacy. The next section explores the shifting expectations regarding the social 
responsibilities of the private sector, in particular TNCs, in more detail and introduces the concept of 
CSR. 
2.2.2 CSR 
Parallel to the debate on global governance, the CSR literature has discussed the shifting responsibilities of 
corporations vis-à-vis society. While corporations have a long tradition of engaging in social issues dating 
back to the nineteenth century, the concept of socially responsible business has rapidly expanded on a 
global scale since the early 1990s. This rise is reflected in the large number of corporate codes of conducts, 
CSR reports, and consultants and internal management structures dedicated to CSR (Vogel 2005: 6-7). 
Vogel (2005: 7) notes that “[i]n addition to having become more institutionalized, the contemporary 
resurgence of CSR is distinctive for its new focus and spread around the world”. Issues covered by CSR 
range from the environment, community relations and labor to human rights. Geographically, CSR has 
spread from the United States of America (USA) to Europe and emerging countries such as China and 
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India (Baskin 2006; Vogel 2005: 7). The global character of CSR is further mirrored by an increasing 
global awareness, the promotion of CSR through global actors such as the United Nations and the 
adoption of CSR policies by powerful TNCs (Mühle 2010: 30-31). NGOs were very influential in 
pressuring corporations to behave more responsible during the 1990s. Together with strategic 
organizational decisions of business actors, the external pressure lead to a re-emergence of CSR, originally 
promoted by international organizations during the 1970s (Mühle 2010). The global diffusion of CSR was 
facilitated by the growing interactions of business, civil society and international organizations in the face 
of globalization. In addition to the proactive promotion of CSR through NGOs and political actors, such 
as international organizations and states, business has played a strong role in the diffusion process (Mühle 
2010).  
 Despite the prominence of CSR, there is no consensus on what it entails. CSR is applied as a 
general and inclusive term that covers aspects of what some authors label Corporate Citizenship or 
Corporate Social Performance (Feil 2012: 36-40). In this research, the general concern of CSR is 
understood as the “responsible management of the relationship between companies and society” (Feil 
2012: 40). The scope and content of that responsibility is, however, unclear. Minimalistic conceptions of 
CSR refer to the reduction of adverse societal impacts and the protection or enhancement of societal 
assets, while maximalist definitions focus on proactive behavior of businesses (Rieth/Zimmer 2004a: 12-
13). The European Union has developed a medium-reach definition that is commonly referred to. It is 
subsequently applied in this thesis. The definition refers to CSR as “a concept whereby companies 
integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (European Commission 2001: 6). Although there is no consensus on a 
standard definition, the definition applied by the European Union captures the main features accepted by 
the large majority of scholars and policymakers in the debate on CSR. First, it is assumed that business has 
a responsibility beyond profit maximization. It, therefore, appears that the stakeholder approach has 
overtaken the shareholder approach (Feil 2012: 40). While the shareholder theory argues that the 
responsibility of business is to maximize the returns to shareholders (Friedman 1970), stakeholder theory 
assumes that companies should create value for all stakeholders affected by business such as employees, 
customers, communities and governments (Donaldson/Preston 1995; Freeman 1984). CSR thus entails a 
departure from former understandings of business roles corresponding to Friedman’s much-cited article 
entitled “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits” (Friedman 1970). It does, 
however, not dispute that corporations have an “economic responsibility” to fulfill (Carroll 1979: 500). A 
second feature identified in the debate on CSR is the voluntary nature of corporate engagement. To be 
qualified as CSR, corporate engagement has to go beyond legal requirements. Inherently assumed in this 
concept is that business has to operate within the framework of legal requirements (Carroll 1979: 500). 
Finally, CSR is understood as a tool that is applied to core business and not as “an optional ‘add-on’” 
(European Commission 2002: 5). Drauth (2010: 1) points out that “CSR is not about what a company 
does with its profits (e.g. sponsoring the local football club or initiating a one-time social project), but 
about how it makes that profit”.  
Similar to the concept of governance, CSR is applied both as an analytical tool and a normative 
description of the role of business in society. On the one hand, the CSR debate has filled the concept with 
ethically, normatively and culturally motivated expectations of corporate rights and duties, reflecting the 
changed understanding of corporate roles over the past decades (Curbach 2009: 25-26). As such, CSR 
represents an empty formula to be filled with societal-normative expectations of the role of corporations 
(Curbach 2009: 26). Any definition of the “social responsibility” of corporations, therefore, draws on 
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concrete social norms. On the other hand, CSR is used as an analytical framework to capture and classify 
corporate behavior towards society, particularly corporate contributions to a collective interest (Feil 2012: 
36).   
2.3 Corporate contributions to peace and security 
Analogous to the general move towards CSR and governance roles, TNCs have committed to socially 
responsible behavior in conflict zones. The aim of this section is to briefly introduce the recent emergence 
of the business-in-peace agenda and provide an analytical framework for corporate engagement towards 
peace and security by drawing on the concepts of CSR and governance. The framework is subsequently 
applied in the empirical case study. 
 2.3.1 The emergence of the business-in-peace agenda 
The shifting role of TNCs is reflected by a growing engagement in different policy areas. Engagement in 
“low politics” such as health, the environment or economic development has featured prominently. 
Microsoft, for example, has partnered with the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO) to support small and medium enterprises (UNIDO/Microsoft 2008); Chiquita has 
implemented policies to ensure environmental standards throughout its supply chain (Chiquita 2008); and 
Mercedes Benz is part of a public private partnership to combat HIV/AIDS (Müller-Debus et al. 2009). 
Peace and security as a classic field of “high politics”, on the other hand, are primarily considered as core 
responsibilities of the state (Deitelhoff et al. 2010: 205). It is only recently that corporate engagements 
towards peace and security have gained prominence both in public policy circles and the private sector.  
NGOs have played a major role in bringing business in conflict to the forefront of the international 
community’s attention in the 1990s (see Section 2.1.2). In addition to linking corporations with conflict, 
NGOs such as International Alert and the Council for Economic Priorities spurred public and scholarly 
interest in corporate conflict prevention (Haufler 2010: 119-120). The multistakeholder initiative United 
Nations Global Compact (UNGC), established by the former Secretary-General Kofi Annan to promote 
social norms for the business community in 1999, took up the issue of business in conflict in its first 
policy dialogue. Interestingly, the topic was pushed on the agenda by business leaders, in particular the 
diamond industry that was under public pressure for the trade in “conflict diamonds” (Haufler 2010: 120). 
The aim of the policy dialogue was to identify ways to help mitigate negative impacts of business in 
conflict and enhance the capacity of business to contribute to conflict prevention (UNGC 2007: 45). So 
far, the UNGC has published various policy papers, developed guidance tools and convened several 
workshops on the subject. Another high-profile partnership are the Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights. The governments of the United Kingdom (UK) and the USA launched the initiative by 
bringing together companies of the extractive sector and NGOs “to seek common grounds on security 
and human rights issues” (VP 2013). In the framework of the partnership, companies such as BP and 
Total commit to human rights standards while maintaining their own security and safety. Throughout the 
following years, the business-in-peace agenda gained momentum in the international community. Other 
global partnerships promoting responsible conduct of corporations in conflict zones and active 
contributions to peace and security include the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme, aimed at curtailing 
the trade with illicit diamonds, and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a 
multistakeholder initiative to promote revenue transparency. In 2011, the United Nations efforts to 
promote responsible business in conflict zones finally culminated in the adoption of the Guiding 
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Principles on Business and Human Rights. In addition to the standards developed within multistakeholder 
initiatives, TNCs unilaterally include conflict-relevant and conflict-sensitive provisions in their codes of 
conduct. Such commitments cover various issues from community development to provisions on security 
arrangements with governments.  
While states, NGOs and international organizations appear to acknowledge the potential of corporate 
contributions towards peace and security and business actors become increasingly responsive to such 
expectations, the scientific community seems to be reluctant to extend the research on global private 
governance and CSR to the field of peace and security. For scholars who are interested in theoretical 
generalizations across sectors this lack of systematic research is particularly surprising because security 
represents a “hard case” for private self-regulation (Wolf et al. 2007: 295).  
The following section provides a framework for the analysis of corporate engagement in zones of conflict. 
It builds on the work of Feil (2012) and Wolf et al. (2007), who attempt to bridge the evident “knowledge 
gaps” (Jamali/Mirshak 2010: 444) and offer points of departure for systematic academic research.  
2.3.2 Conceptualizing corporate engagement towards peace and security 
The analytical framework developed in this section categorizes TNC engagement in zones of conflict and 
analyzes how TNC engagement can be linked to peace and security. The literature on business in conflict 
identifies a wide range of corporate behavior and decisions available to TNCs operating in conflict. 
According to Wolf et al. (2007), the activities and initiatives of corporations in zones of conflict can be 
classified in four forms on the output (“words” and commitments) and outcome (“deeds” and behavioral 
changes) dimension, namely, i) proactive engagement towards peace and security, ii) business as usual, iii) 
withdrawal and iv) taking advantage of public regulation gaps. Least likely to have a positive impact on 
security in zones of conflict are companies that take advantage of regulatory gaps emerging in the context 
of insecurity. The trade in “conflict diamonds”, for example, has supported the maintenance of war 
economies in Sierra Leone and Angola. When corporations pursue their business operations “as usual” 
they generally comply with international laws and standards and a national regulatory framework that is 
oftentimes insufficient or not effectively implemented. For Nelson (2000), this form of engagement 
represents a minimum of corporate responsibility in conflicts. It is, however, not sufficient in ensuring 
that companies avoid negative impacts and create positive value. As demonstrated in Section 2.1.2, TNCs 
often fuel conflict through unintended effects. Withdrawal from a conflict zone represents another option, 
in which companies may at least “do no harm”. But similar to “business as usual”, disengagement from a 
conflict zone does not automatically lead to more peaceful and stable environments (Rittberger 2004: 22-
23). The withdrawal of the Canadian oil company Talisman from Sudan, for instance, allowed a less 
transparent Chinese company to take over the operations (Feil 2012: 18). For these reasons, proactive 
engagement can be assumed to most likely contribute to peace and security, even though the different 
mechanisms and policies have not been systematically tested with regard to their impact and effectiveness 
(Wolf et al. 2007: 311).  
Before delving into the different mechanisms linking corporations to peace, this section identifies the 
defining features of corporate engagement towards peace and security.6 Based on the work of Feil (2012), 
who has developed a thorough and systematic conceptualization of the term, corporate engagement is 
defined by drawing on the concepts of governance and CSR as introduced in previous sections. In a 
                                                 
6 For the remainder of this thesis, „engagement towards peace and security“ will mean „proactive engagement“. The 
term „proactive engagement“ is avoided here, as some researchers have a narrower understanding that excludes, for 
instance part of conflict-sensitive policies and activities (e.g. Nelson 2000).  
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second step, the section analyzes whether and how such engagement links to peace and security. 
Corporate engagement towards peace and security is treated here as a governance contribution, although it 
shares the main characteristics of the defining features of CSR. A first defining feature of corporate 
engagement that is both a characteristic of governance and CSR concepts is that policies or activities 
surpass legal obligations (Feil 2012: 54-55). While CSR clearly emphasizes the voluntary nature of 
corporate engagement, governance reaches beyond the law by encompassing soft law such as voluntary 
codes of conduct, notably in environments that lack formal regulation. Feil (2012: 51) notes that in the 
context of zones of conflict and failed states, in which states cannot or will not implement existing 
regulations, the implementation of existing rules can be considered as an engagement beyond common 
practice or law. A second feature, comprised in both governance and CSR, is the need for a policy or 
activity to go beyond basic business needs (Feil 2012: 54). The reach of such engagement represents the 
indicator that distinguishes governance from CSR. While governance explicitly addresses common goods 
and collective regulation, CSR comprises a broader reach. The stakeholders to which corporations are 
responsible cover different groups of society but include, for instance, companies’ own employees. CSR 
therefore encompasses a narrower, private reach excluded in governance concepts. The third defining 
feature for corporate engagement thus stipulates that a policy or activity needs to reach beyond the private 
good, understood here as the company including, for example, its employees. A fourth feature that is 
again shared in both governance and CSR concepts is that policies and activities are not sporadic. A 
governance contribution is a continuous engagement rather than a sporadic behavior. Similarly, CSR 
policies and activities that are applied to core business have a long-term perspective.7 As a final criterion 
for governance, a policy or activity must hold some political quality and therefore relate to areas of 
security, government or welfare in its broadest sense (Feil 2012: 56). Here, the concept of governance is 
more specific than CSR, which encompasses a wider reach. In sum, to be categorized as corporate 
engagement towards peace and security, in this case a corporate governance contribution,8 a policy or 
activity must i) surpass legal obligations, ii) go beyond basic business needs, iii) reach beyond the private 
good, iv) not be sporadic and v) hold some political quality.  
Having identified indicators for corporate engagement as a governance contribution, corporate 
engagement is now linked to peace and security in a second step. Based on Feil (2012) and Deitelhoff and 
Wolf (2010a), corporate engagement is categorized along its connection to security. Security and peace are 
defined in a narrow sense, meaning the absence of violence (Müller 2003). The most evident contribution 
to peace and security addresses violent conflict directly. Possible contributions include the facilitation of 
peace negotiations, mediation among conflict parties or support for disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration efforts (Nelson 2000; Oetzel et al. 2007: 344-45; Rettberg 2011: 91; Wenger/Möckli 2003: 
130-132). Moreover, TNCs can provide security to a wider community surrounding the companies’ 
operations (Feil 2012: 57). While acknowledging the potential roles for corporations, researchers express 
skepticism about the legitimacy and capacity of direct business contributions to security (e.g. 
Wenger/Möckli 2003: 132).  
In addition to direct contributions, TNCs can contribute to peace and security through indirect 
mechanisms. Feil (2012: 56-61) differentiates conflict-relevant and conflict-sensitive approaches. Conflict-
                                                 
7 In this feature, the conceptualization deviates from Feil (2012), who conceptualizes CSR in a broader framework 
that includes sporadic, philanthropic policies and activities.  
8 Corporate engagement towards peace and security is conceptualized as a governance contribution because peace 
and security represent collective goods and hold a political quality. Both features are possibly, but not necessarily, 
captured by the concept of CSR. Moreover, while engagement needs to go beyond sporadic policies and activities, it 
does not necessarily have to apply to core business.  
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relevant approaches address root causes or (de)escalating factors previously identified in a conflict analysis. 
While violent conflicts are generally highly complex and involve multiple, interacting causes, many 
conflicts share distinct patterns such as poor economic conditions, repressive political systems, 
degradation of renewable natural resources and ethnic diversity (Smith D. 2004: 115-117). Research on 
“new wars” has identified abundance in and dependence on natural resources as further risk factors of 
violent conflict (Collier/Hoeffler 2004; De Soysa 2000; Le Billon 2001). Corporate engagement can, 
therefore, address the level of violence through other policy fields. On the dimension of political order, 
typical fields of corporate engagement include the promotion of the rule of law, human rights, and 
transparency (Nelson 2000; Rieth/Zimmer 2004b: 83; Rosenau et al. 2009: 4). Previously identified 
negative connections, such as support of corrupt and repressive states, offer points of departure for 
positive interventions, for instance human rights codes or transparency initiatives in cooperation with the 
state. On the socioeconomic dimension, TNCs can contribute through the transformation of war 
economies and the fight against poverty and social divides (Deitelhoff/Wolf 2010a: 13; Rieth/Zimmer 
2004b: 82). The policy area further encompasses the management of the environment and natural 
resources (Nelson 2000; Rustad et al. 2012). A third area of intervention is the socio-cultural dimension. 
In this policy field, TNCs can address socio-psychological grievances of violent conflict or promote a 
culture of peace (Feil 2012: 59). Policies and activities can be directed at an independent media, 
reconciliation or peace education (Deitelhoff/Wolf 2010a: 13). Within the different policy fields, conflict-
relevant contributions are aimed at creating value and comprise what many term pro-active engagement 
(Jamali/Mirshak 2010: 452; Nelson 2000: 29; Wolf et al. 2007: 304). Similarly to the negative impacts, 
value creation can occur at the macro and micro level. At the macro level, corporate engagement 
addresses national and international structures, whereas micro-level engagement focuses on problems of 
companies’ operations, for instance with regard to neighboring communities (Nelson 2000: 143). As 
indirect, conflict-relevant contributions cover a broad spectrum, Feil (2012: 59) cautions against 
conceptual overstretching. In order to avoid assessing all engagement as conflict-relevant, Feil 
recommends a thorough conflict analysis determining relevant issues of the three conflict-relevant 
dimensions.   
In addition to conflict-relevant engagement, corporations can contribute indirectly to peace and security 
through conflict-sensitive policies and activities. On the one hand, conflict-sensitivity includes the 
consideration of how policies and activities are developed and implemented, therefore allowing for 
procedural approaches to peace and security. Corporations pursue, for instance, participatory approaches 
in their relations with local communities to increase their relevance (Feil 2012: 59). On the other hand, 
conflict-sensitivity refers to the “do-no-harm” approach, meaning strategies towards the reduction of 
negative impacts of companies on conflict or the process of peace (Prandi/Lozano 2011: 10).  
While acknowledging the potential of the different possible governance contributions of corporations 
towards peace and security outlined in this section, the thesis is aware of its limitations. The impact of 
such engagement has not been systematically tested and, so far, case studies paint a mixed picture 
(Deitelhoff et al. 2010; Feil 2012; Hönke 2012). Aside from the ambivalent impacts of corporate 
engagement on peace and security, the focus on corporate contributions to governance is criticized for its 
lack of a theory of power. It “overlooks the strategies that can be employed by the powerful to control the 
agenda and frame the issues in ways that deny spaces for opposition” (Garvey/Newell 2005: 392). The 
discursive power of TNCs can obscure that the impact of their engagement is little or even negative. 
Moreover, critics draw attention to democratic deficits, inadequate scope of policies and issues such as 
“regulatory capture” (Bendell 2004: 17; Utting 2005: 382-384). Notwithstanding these considerations, it is 
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assumed that corporations can make valuable contributions to peace and security under still largely 
unknown circumstances that need to be determined in future research (Wolf et al. 2007: 314). In a fist step 
towards a comprehensive understanding of corporate engagement in peace and security, this thesis will 
investigate the potential conditions under which corporations pursue policies and activities directed at 
peace and security in the following section.  
2.4 Explaining corporate contributions to peace and security  
Research on business and conflict has identified a variety of factors explaining corporate engagement 
towards peace and security in conflict zones, mostly through empirical analysis. Different analyses 
indicated that there is not one factor that can explain corporate governance contribution alone, but rather a 
combination of factors that increase the likelihood for corporate engagement (Wolf/Schwindenhammer 
2011: 14). According to previous research, company and industry characteristics represent one major 
bundle of factors (Ballentine/Nitzschke 2004: 39-44; Bray 2009: 5-11; Nelson 2000: 56-60; Wolf et al. 
2007: 304-306). Visibility and reputation of a company, for example, influence how vulnerable it is with 
regard to transnational activist pressure (Haufler 2001b: 662-663). Closely connected to this factor is the 
size of a company (Wolf et al. 2007: 304). As such, the company size can also be relevant for the 
likelihood of engagement insofar as larger companies have greater financial, material and organizational 
resources (Oetzel et al. 2007: 352). Another company characteristic found to influence corporate 
engagement is corporate culture, particularly the extent to which CSR is an organizational norm (Feil 
2012: 24; Wolf et al. 2007: 305). In addition to company characteristics, the type of industry, including 
production-specific factors, influences the likelihood of engagement. In the literature, asset specificity and 
mobility feature as important factors (Haufler 2001b: 662; Rittberger 2004: 23). The extractive industry, 
for example, is tied to a specific location and often makes considerable investments with a long-term 
outlook. Therefore, corporations from this sector cannot easily move their production elsewhere. While 
there appears to be a broad spectrum of relevant company and industry characteristics, they do not bear 
sufficient explanatory value. Wenger and Möckli (2003: 122) note that there is no single type of industry or 
company that typically contributes to conflict prevention. Overall, there is a significant variation of 
corporate engagement within sectors and, for instance, among companies of the same size (e.g. Pegg 2006; 
Shankleman 2006: 71-72). Moreover, there has been a variation over time while many company and 
production characteristics remained relatively stable. Hence, more dynamic, exogenous factors need to be 
taken into account. 
The literature on business engagement in conflict zones finds market, social and political environments of 
corporations, globally and in both the host and home country, relevant factors. As delineated in the global 
governance and CSR literature, the business environment of corporations has changed significantly in the 
past two decades. Corporations operate not only in a narrow economic market constellation, but interact 
with a variety of public and private stakeholders such as states, international organizations, transnational 
civil society and shareholders. They hold different expectations of corporate conduct and challenge and 
induce corporations to engage through different mechanisms. Authors either argue from rationalist 
perspectives along the lines of cost-benefit calculations (logic of consequences) or constructivist 
perspectives emphasizing the role of norms in shaping corporations’ preferences (logic of 
appropriateness). The home state of a corporation, for example, can influence corporations through 
various approaches from legalistic and confrontational mechanisms to cooperative schemes that can incur 
either costs or benefits. From a constructivist perspective, the home state influences corporations through 
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socialization of norms and practices (Deitelhoff et al. 2010: 213). In some cases, a combination of 
rationalist and constructivist approaches is applied (e.g. Deitelhoff/Wolf 2010b; Rieth/Zimmer 2004a). 
This thesis does not ex ante exclude any causal path as both approaches are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive and may in fact reinforce each other (Fearon/Wendt 2002; Wolf/Schwindenhammer 2011: 17). 
However, for the purpose of this thesis a rationalist framework is employed. Such an analytical lens seems 
more suited for a question that seeks to explain actions rather than preferences of corporations 
(Fearon/Wendt 2002: 64). The framework adopted is applied here as an analytical tool and not as a 
metaphysical position or empirical description of the world (Fearon/Wendt 2002: 52). It entails a broader 
understanding of action in terms of beliefs, desires and meanings than commonly assumed. For this thesis, 
corporations are assumed to pursue their self-interest, namely profit-maximization. However, this does 
not mean that firms employ a narrow market rationality based on short-term profits and benefits. Instead, 
it is more likely that corporations are motivated by complex market rationality. Wolf et al. (2007: 299) 
explain that in the complex social, political and market environments of today, “business has to include a 
bundle of factors within its cost–benefit calculations, including the management of reputational costs, 
normative expectations of stakeholders and the public”. The transnational civil society is highlighted as a 
major influence on the behavior of corporations both in the literature on business and conflict and more 
general works on global governance and CSR, which is why it will be considered here in more detail. The 
role of the host state, although not covered in such detail by the literature, is expected to play a crucial role 
for the local dynamic of conflicts. It will, therefore, be analyzed as a second factor. Other influences of the 
market, social and political environment identified in the research (e.g. competitors, home states and 
international organizations) are considered in the empirical analysis when relevant in the specific case, but 
cannot be explored in more detail in this framework.  
In addition to the different factors in the wider social, political and market environment of a corporation, 
conflict characteristics can play a role in the probability of engagement. So far, few scholars have looked at 
conflict characteristics (e.g. Berman 2000; Deitelhoff/Wolf 2010a; Feil 2012) but rather treated them like 
“an elephant in the room, which authors are aware of but refrain from explicitly assessing” (Feil 2012: 26). 
The following sections address this deficit and delve into the potential influence of transnational activism 
and the host state environment.  
2.4.1 Civil society activism 
Civil society actors9 have played a strong role in bringing corporate governance contributions and CSR on 
the agenda. In the context of global governance, civil society itself, in particular NGOs, has evolved into 
an important governance actor that participates in rule-making and the provision of common goods on 
local, national and transnational levels. A central feature of their role in governance is that civil society 
actors not only actively contribute to public goods but also push other actors to adopt different standards 
and policies. Transnational advocacy networks, bound together by shared values, a common discourse and 
dense exchanges, have played an influential role in this regard by targeting states, international 
organizations and corporations (Keck/Sikkink 1998; Spar/La Mure 2003). In addition to setting the 
agenda, as in the case for corporations in conflict zones, transnational activists networks and NGOs can 
pressure or induce corporations to engage in a variety of issues including peace and security through 
different mechanisms. 
                                                 
9 Civil society is defined here as a political arena of society that is separate from family, the economy and the state 
(Zinecker 2011). It includes a variety of actors, such as NGOs, trade unions and religious groups.  
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Campaigns and consumer boycotts that “name and shame” corporations for misconduct, for example, can 
incur direct costs for corporations. Furthermore, being associated with violence can incur reputational 
costs (Deitelhoff/Wolf 2010a: 16). Companies with reputational concerns have an interest in keeping 
good relations with their stakeholders and are likely to respond to transnational activist pressures to avoid 
material and reputational costs (Haufler 2001a: 26-27; Rieth/Zimmer 2004a: 17). This also works the 
other way around. Companies may actively seek an enhanced reputation by setting higher standards than 
competitors (Börzel et al. 2011; Vogel 2005). Civil society actors can provide incentives for such behavior, 
for example through dialogue and service provision or direct partnership. In contrast to confrontational 
strategies, such collaborative approaches can provide an enabling environment for corporations that seek 
to increase their legitimacy among stakeholders (Flohr et al. 2010: 157).  
The hypothesis following from the brief outline is summarized as: Transnational civil society activism around 
security- and conflict-related issues directed at a company leads to corporate engagement towards peace and security in zones of 
conflict. Initiatives of transnational civil society actors are taken as indicative of transnational activism. They 
include both confrontational and collaborative strategies, for example watchdog activities, boycotts, legal 
activism, advocacy, dialogue, service provision and partnership (Oliviero/Simmons 2002; Utting/Ives 
2006: 13-14).  
2.4.2 The host state environment 
Zones of conflict are special governance environments that indicate a failure in the provision of security. 
The “new wars” literature suggests that, often, such governance failures occur on a broad scale (Kaldor 
1999). States are incapable of enforcing rules in parts of their territories and policy sectors. Thus, 
corporations are faced with a challenging operating environment whereby they cannot count on the host 
state to provide security and other basic collective goods. Some authors suggest that faced with the threat 
of anarchy and the associated costs, corporations may opt to provide governance themselves (Börzel 
2010: 19, Wolf et al. 2007: 307-308). In contrast, findings show that consolidated statehood is instrumental 
in ensuring the provision of collective goods by non-state actors (e.g. Héritier/Lehmkuhl 2008). The 
“shadow of hierarchy” induces governance with and without government by the credible threat of 
coercion to unilaterally adopt and enforce regulation if non-state actors are unwilling to engage in 
governance (Börzel 2012: 8-9). Corporations seek to avoid the cost of regulation or enforcement (Haufler 
2001a: 21). They can be expected to prefer voluntary governance schemes because they allow for an 
increased degree of autonomy, especially in the framework of unilateral action (Flohr et al. 2010: 126-
136).10 Börzel (2010: 17) notes that a medium “shadow of hierarchy” is required to make governance with 
and without government work. On the one hand, governments need to have the capacity to cast a credible 
“shadow of hierarchy”. On the other hand, government capacities must not be too strong in order to 
provide an incentive for governments to seek cooperation with non-state actors and to avoid fears of 
agency-capture by non-state actors. In this line of argument, corporations are expected to contribute to 
governance when the host state casts a medium “shadow of hierarchy”.  
This concurs with the empirical evidence of Feil, which suggests “that corporations require at least the 
shadow of a government counterpart to become engaged” (Feil 2012: 157). The results, however, go 
further by showing that the “counterpart must have both (coercive) capacity and willingness” (Feil 2012: 
158). States that are willing to contribute to the provision of public goods may induce corporations to 
                                                 
10 In some cases, corporations lobby for government regulation to restrain competition or gain consumer confidence 
(Börzel et al. 2011; Haufler 2001a: 21).  
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become engaged by facilitating and endorsing corporate governance contributions or partnering with 
corporations in multistakeholder schemes (Fox et al. 2002). While the state can render material, financial 
or organizational support, it is also “the major source of legitimacy for governance” (Börzel 2012). 
Moreover, the willingness to provide public goods only gives real credibility of the “shadow of hierarchy”. 
Together, a medium “shadow of hierarchy” and willingness to provide public goods can induce 
corporations to engage through a threat and/or appeal mechanism.11 In states with weak willingness, on the 
other hand, companies need not fear further regulation and enforcement, nor might their engagement be 
welcome, particularly in authoritarian and repressive states (Deitelhoff et al. 2010: 214). In this case, the 
state offers neither incentives nor credible threats and might actually incur costs for corporations when 
they become engaged. 
 Following this outline, the assumption is the following: Medium host state capacity to implement 
governance unilaterally coupled with host state willingness to provide peace and security leads to corporate engagement towards 
peace and security. Indicators for host state capacity to implement governance are the monopoly of violence 
and administrative capacity (Risse/Leibfried 2011: 268). Indicators for the willingness to provide public 
goods (in this case peace and security) are policies and activities towards the provision of peace and 
security.  
2.4.3 Conflict characteristics  
Conflicts represent difficult and extreme operating environments for corporations. While few scholars 
have systematically analyzed the influence of conflict characteristics on corporate governance 
contributions, several factors were identified as relevant. Conflict proximity appears to be relevant as it 
influences whether companies suffer economic costs from violence. Nelson (2000: 62) notes that “[a] 
company will face more obvious risks if violent conflict is having a direct impact on the company’s 
operations, either in the workplace or along the local supply or distribution chain”. It is expected that “[a] 
company will have less ability, usually less interest and often less legitimacy […] to intervene in conflicts 
that are occurring further afield and not directly affecting its immediate operations” (Nelson 2000: 62). 
The assumption is summarized as: Conflict proximity leads to corporate engagement towards peace and security. Other 
possible influences identified in the literature were conflict phase and the prominence of economic factors 
(Feil 2012). However, as they did not prove to be decisive factors in the empirical analysis they will not be 
considered here in more detail. 
2.5 Case selection  
As laid out in the introduction, this thesis relies on a comparative case study to investigate the conditions 
of corporate engagement towards peace and security. The hypotheses developed on the basis of existing 
literature in the sections above serve as a guiding tool in the analysis. It is expected that a more detailed 
investigation of the causal mechanisms leading to corporate engagement in both cases will lead to a more 
comprehensive understanding.  
While the review of literature on business in conflict, global governance and CSR often considers a wider 
spectrum of corporate actors, the interest of this thesis lies with TNCs. They received a plethora of 
                                                 
11 While at first sight, both threat and appeal mechanisms appear to belong to either state capacity or willingness, 
they actually need both capacity and willingness together. Without willingness, the state cannot cast a credible threat. 
And without capacity, the state cannot effectively facilitate governance contributions, through either legal or political 




attention for their links with conflict. At the same time, TNCs are the focus of attention in the global 
governance and CSR discourse. In the business-in-peace literature, high expectations are laid upon them.12 
The two cases selected for the empirical analysis are drawn from a single unit, namely TNCs from the oil 
industry, to serve the criterion of comparability (Gerring 2004: 348). Company and industry factors are 
therefore kept largely constant, but will be addressed in interaction effects with other dynamic variables. 
Among TNCs, the oil industry was chosen as a least likely case for engagement. In the past, the extractive 
industry has been subject to heavy criticism for its involvement in violent conflicts. Due to their asset 
specificity, TNCs from the extractive sector usually decide to maintain their operations in the case of 
violent conflict. Furthermore, violence often occurs precisely because of the presence or extraction of 
natural resources, such as oil, involving TNCs even more directly (e.g. Renner 2002). A second criterion 
for the focus on the oil industry is that it resembles a situation of current policy concern (Van Evera 1997: 
83-84). While it has received largely negative publicity in the past, policymakers and the public have 
developed high expectations of the extractive sector in reversing the negative impact in zones of conflict 
during the last years. 
The cases selected from the oil industry are Shell’s engagement in Nigeria from 1990 to 2013 and BP’s 
engagement in Azerbaijan from 1992 to 2013.13 While Shell in the Niger Delta is a prominent example in 
the literature on business involvement in zones of conflict (e.g. Hook/Ganguly 2000; Renner 2002: 46-47; 
Rieth/Zimmer 2004a), BP’s engagement in Azerbaijan has received only limited attention (Davis 2013; 
Gulbrandsen/Moe 2007). Both companies display a proactive engagement towards peace and security in 
the respective zones of conflict since the late 1990s and are considered pioneers of CSR within the sector 
(Frynas 2009: 21). While the value of the dependent variable is similar, the two different conflict and 
governance contexts from two different regions for corporate engagement in zones of conflict can be 
expected to allow for variance on the independent variables (“method of agreement”). The purpose of the 
comparative case study is to investigate the causal mechanisms leading to each company’s proactive 
engagement towards peace and security and to identify relevant similarities between the two cases. In 
addition to the variation between the two cases, the study of corporate behavior over time allows for 
multiple observations of engagement and influences in different phases of each case. 
3. COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY  
3.1 Shell’s engagement in Nigeria 
The following sections analyze Shell’s engagement in the conflict environment of Nigeria from 1990 until 
2013 and investigate the conditions of Shell’s engagement towards peace and security. In order to 
understand the operating environment and identify relevant corporate contributions towards peace and 
security, the next sections introduce the conflict background including causes and pertinent issues. 
Afterwards, a short profile of Shell provides important background information on the company and its 
production structure.  
3.1.1 Violent conflicts in the Niger Delta 
Nigeria is a conflict zone that currently harbors six different conflicts of varying intensity in different parts 
of the country (HIIK 2012: 31). The oil companies present in Nigeria, including Shell, are primarily 
                                                 
12 The focus is primarily on TNCs rooted in the global North. Although there is an increasing number of TNCs 
from other parts of the world (UNCTAD 2011a), the overall focus remains on the OECD-world.  
13 The timeframe extends to the date of completion of this thesis in March 2013.  
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affected by conflicts in the Niger Delta because the large majority of oil operations are situated in this 
region. Other conflicts, including the conflict between Christians and Muslims or Boko Haram versus the 
government, are situated in the Central and Northern parts of the country and bear only limited relevance 
to the oil companies. Therefore, the conflict analysis is restricted to the Niger Delta, a region in the South 
of Nigeria (see Appendix: Figure 1). The region is of major significance to the Nigerian state as it accounts 
for over 90 percent of crude oil production in the country (Oboreh 2010: 17). The majority of oil 
production activities are located in the states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers. In the media, the Niger Delta is 
particularly known for the violent conflicts that have persisted in the region since the 1990s. The current 
conflicts are embedded in a long history of secessionist movements since Nigeria gained independence in 
1960. After a longer period of more localized, low-intensity conflicts following the civil war from 1967 to 
1970, violence re-erupted at the beginning of the 1990s (Mähler 2010: 12). At the beginning of the 1990s, 
the conflict between the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) or, more generally, 
the ethnic group of the Ogoni, and the military regime dominated the Niger Delta. In 1997, the dynamics 
shifted towards the conflict between different ethnic Ijaw groups and the government. While the two 
conflicts share certain commonalities, they are distinctive in character and will be treated separately.  
The first eruptions of violence between the Ogoni and the government at the beginning of the 1990s were 
preceded by community protests against the government and oil companies and the establishment of the 
MOSOP. Their demands ranged from compensation for environmental degradation to control over 
natural resources and political rights for the Ogoni people as expressed in the Ogoni Bill of Rights 
(MOSOP 1990). MOSOP pursued a peaceful approach that was, however, met with violent repression on 
the side of the authoritarian military regime. Repression by military and police forces included beatings, 
looting, torture, rape and extra-judicial killings (Ibeanu/Luckham 2007: 66). Furthermore, the government 
established a military body to suppress MOSOP protests. As a result of repression and violence, some 
2,000 Ogoni were killed (Renner 2002: 167). Despite international protests, MOSOP leader Ken Saro-
Wiwa and eight other MOSOP activists were executed in 1995, leaving the Ogoni movement severely 
weakened. 
 After 1996, conflict erupted mainly in the Delta State following the Kaiama Declaration of the 
Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), which expressed similar demands to MOSOP, including resource control and 
the withdrawal of military forces (IYC 1998). The government's response to the declaration relied heavily 
on repression. Violent clashes erupted between Ijaw youth groups and state security forces and also 
among ethnic groups. As youth groups further extended their activities on the occupation of Shell stations 
and kidnappings of staff, oil companies increasingly became the target of attacks. Among the various 
armed groups in the Niger Delta dominating the conflict in the following years, the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has caught particular attention of the media. Like MOSOP 
and IYC, MEND aims for resource control (Sahara Reporters 2007). In addition to attacks on oil 
installations, MEND has taken responsibility for car bombings, a large number of kidnappings and attacks 
on government facilities (Watts 2008: 53). The government responded to these attacks with military tactics 
against insurgents and communities accused of assisting or harboring them. Clashes between insurgents 
and the military left numerous insurgents dead and arrested (Watts 2008: 53). In 2009, the government 
pursued a different strategic approach by offering insurgents amnesty. Despite an official rejection by 
MEND, many rebels accepted the offer. Nevertheless, MEND's sporadic attacks continued throughout 
2010 and 2011 (McNamee 2012). Another dimension of the conflict is the deepening criminality. Piracy, 
kidnappings and oil bunkering are widespread and serve as funding mechanisms for armed groups (Asuni 
2009: 10; Hazen/Horner 2007: 69-71; International Crisis Group 2009: 5).  
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3.1.2 Root causes and key issues  
There are at least five root causes that have led to violence in the Niger Delta, namely low socioeconomic 
development, cultural and political cleavages, fragile statehood and adverse social and ecological effects of 
oil production, and the organization of the political system, in particular, the distribution of revenues 
(Mähler 2010: 29; Zimmer 2010: 61-62). They are not confined to, but relate closely to the oil factor 
(Mähler 2010). Moreover, there are various escalating factors of violence in the Niger Delta. In a 
preliminary step to identifying conflict-relevant engagement, escalating factors and causes of violence in 
the Niger Delta are laid out and classified on the political order, socioeconomic and sociocultural 
dimensions. In the realm of political order, violence is linked to the nature of the Nigerian state, which is 
used as an instrument for competing ethnic and regional elites to maintain disorder and accumulate capital 
(Engel 2005: 200). On the one hand, the historical weakness of political institutions undermined the 
effectiveness of political output and the capacity of the state to provide security (Mähler 2010: 23). The 
resulting “public security gap”, which may have widened with Nigeria’s transition to democracy in 1999 
(Ibenanu/Luckham 2007: 84), has created an opportunity structure for privatized violence. On the other 
hand, the nature of the Nigerian state, coupled with the increasing oil wealth since the 1970s, has given 
rise to rent-seeking, patronage, corruption and the use of political power for private interest (Mähler 2010: 
23, 25). While these conditions fuelled feelings of marginalization in the Niger Delta, they also provided 
the structural basis for the involvement of different actors in illegal activities around oil bunkering (Mähler 
2010: 29). Another factor that has contributed to violence in the Niger Delta is the violent response of the 
Nigerian military regime, supported by oil companies, to the initially peaceful protests of the Ogoni (Pegg 
1999). The population of the Niger Delta experienced that the non-violent strategy failed to achieve its 
purpose and, instead, expressed their grievances through violence (Idemudia/Ite 2006: 395). Although 
repression was reduced with the transition to democracy, the selective and inconsistent application of 
repressive strategies is “fostering counter-violence activities rather than curbing violence” (Mähler 2010: 
24). 
On the socioeconomic dimension, much of the grievances in the Niger Delta are based on the rentier 
state nature of Nigeria. Since the 1970s, oil is the single most important revenue for the Nigerian state. 
Almost 80 percent of federally collected revenue is generated from oil (Central Bank of Nigeria 2012: 
121), making Nigeria a rentier state.14 Despite the oil wealth, socioeconomic development and living 
conditions remain on a low level, mainly due to misguided economic policies and negative effects of the 
oil dependency on other economic sectors, an effect known as “Dutch disease” (Mähler 2012: 395). 
Rather than reinvesting oil revenues in productive sectors or in the provision of public goods, the 
Nigerian elites have used revenues for private gain and patronage networks (Mähler 2010: 29). The rentier 
state theory assumes that elites behave accordingly because state elites do not depend on tax payments and 
are therefore less accountable to the public. In addition to personal accumulation of wealth and patronage, 
the revenue management of the Nigerian state has been a source of conflict, between the federal 
government and the states, the Northern states and the Southern states, and within states. In the wake of 
Nigeria’s centralization policies, the share of oil revenues distributed to the oil-producing regions was 
progressively reduced from 50 percent in 1966 to 1,5 percent in the 1990s, causing feelings of severe 
deprivation among the population of the Niger Delta (Obi 2009: 115-116). Moreover, as Zimmer (2010: 
61) points out, “the question of revenue-sharing is further complicated by rent-seeking behavior, a lack of 
                                                 
14 Rentier states are characterized by substantial external revenues appropriated by the state (Schmidt 1991: 3). 
According to Luciani (1987: 70), the minimum share of rents out of total revenue is 40 percent. 
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transparency and corruption of elites at the federal, state and local levels”. The feelings of relative 
deprivation in the Niger Delta stem from the continuous exclusion from the benefits of oil production 
while, at the same time, the population suffered from the negative social and environmental damage 
(Idemudia/Ite 2006: 398). Oil spills and gas flaring have destroyed livelihoods and involved serious health 
risks (Human Rights Watch 1999). These problems were further reinforced by the neglect of the federal 
government and the oil companies (Zimmer 2010: 62).  
Finally, on the sociocultural dimension, cleavages between religious and other identity groups have fuelled 
violence. First, there is a division between the less developed and mainly Muslim and Hausa-Fulani 
dominated North and the ethnically heterogeneous Christian South. The existing mistrust and fears of 
domination were reinforced with the oil production (Mähler 2010: 27). The oil-producing regions of the 
South, for instance, openly protested the “enrichment” of the North through the federal government at 
the expense of the South (Herbst 1996: 157). A second cleavage is located within the Niger Delta. 
Interethnic and intercommunity conflicts provoke violence even more directly than the Southern rivalry 
with the North.15 On the one hand, minority ethnic groups are concerned about the dominance of larger 
ethnic groups. On the other hand, conflicts have occurred between the Ijaw and other ethnic groups such 
as the Itsekiri and Urhobo regarding the ownership of land and local power (Mähler 2010: 22). While 
many of these conflicts are reinforced with the oil production, they date back to the pre-oil era. The ethnic 
and regional divisions are used for the (violent) mobilization of people and the disruption of politics 
(Engel 2005: 201). Moreover, they fuel feelings of relative deprivation.  
This brief summary gives an impression of the complexity of the Niger Delta conflicts that involve 
various actors and issues. The conflict causes and escalating factors classified along the different 
dimensions are interwoven. Nevertheless, some key issues and mechanisms were identified. First, the real 
and perceived marginalization of the Niger Delta, through political exclusion, state and oil company 
repression, reduced revenues, pervasive poverty and unemployment, and environmental pollution has 
given rise to grievance-driven violence. The weakness of political institutions and the rentier state nature 
of Nigeria have contributed strongly to these adverse conditions. Moreover, the inherent weakness of the 
state, including the pervasive corruption and patronage, has provided an opportunity structure for 
violence and crime. Finally, cleavages among identity groups have multiplied both feelings of relative 
deprivation and rent-seeking behavior. Henceforth, direct conflict interventions could foster an agreement 
between the government, oil companies and violent groups. Additionally, security could be provided for 
local communities as a collective good. On the political order dimension, the fight against corruption, 
notably in the oil industry, would constitute conflict-relevant engagement. And on the socio-economic 
dimension, unemployment, environmental pollution and revenue management in the Niger Delta can be 
addressed. Lastly, on the sociocultural dimension, trust-building measures between communities in the 
Niger Delta as well as between Northern and Southern identity groups can foster peace.  
3.1.3. Company profile 
Shell is a British-Dutch multinational company registered in London and headquartered in The Hague. 
The company, active in the oil and gas industry, operates in more than 80 countries over the world and 
employs approximately 90,000 people (Shell 2012c: 31). In 2012, Shell ranked first among the 500 largest 
companies in the world with annual revenues of US$ 484.4 billion in 2011 (Fortune 2012). Shell is 
                                                 
15 Direct connections to violence refer to conflicts in the Niger Delta. In the Northern regions, the conflict between 
identity groups of the North and South has turned increasingly violent (International Crisis Group 2010b; 2012). 
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engaged in both upstream (search, recovery and production of crude oil and natural gas) and downstream 
(manufacturing, marketing and distribution of oil products and chemicals) activities.16 The company has 
first started exploration activities in Nigeria in 1937. Until the 1950s, Shell held a monopoly over 
exploration of all minerals and petroleum, granted by the British colonial government. In 1956, Shell 
discovered the first commercial quantity of oil in the Niger Delta and began exporting oil in 1958. In the 
wake of the nationalization of the oil industry in the 1970s, the Nigerian government took an equity stake 
in Shell's oil operations, followed by Agip and Elf in 1989. The current joint venture operated by the Shell 
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC)17 is composed of the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) (55 percent), Shell (30 percent), Elf (10 percent) and Agip (5 percent).18 Shell is the 
largest oil and gas company in Nigeria since colonial rule and accounts for approximately half of the oil 
production in the country (Omeje 2006: 34). The company has over 6,000 employees of which more than 
90 percent are Nigerians and its operations spread over 30,000 square meters (Shell n.d.b). The other 
major transnational oil companies in the Nigerian oil industry, ExxonMobil, Chevron and Total, launched 
operations much later than Shell and now dominate in the offshore industry. As Shell's infrastructure and 
operations are based primarily on land, the company has been more directly affected by the conflict 
dynamic than most other multinational oil companies.  
3.1.4 Shell’s engagement in the Nigerian conflict environment 
 The aim of this section is to analyze Shell’s engagement in the Niger Delta conflict environment 
from 1990 until 2013. The investigation period begins with the first major violent eruptions in the Niger 
Delta since the 1970s. Within this period, there are two distinct phases of Shell’s engagement, namely 
“business as usual” until 1996 and engagement towards peace and security since 1997.  
3.1.4.1 “Business as usual” 
When Shell was confronted with community protests and violence around its operations at the beginning 
of the 1990s, it displayed an approach based largely on the idea of keeping the business running while 
protecting company staff and facilities. In its response to the perceived security threats, the company 
relied heavily on security forces. Like most oil companies, Shell used supernumerary police, or so-called 
“spy police”, for internal security. The unarmed officers are typically in charge of guarding a company's 
premises. Furthermore, the company employed private security staff. According to Human Rights Watch, 
20 percent of the total SPDC workforce were security staff in 1997 (Human Right Watch 1999: 105). In 
the wake of the protests, Shell also relied on armed regular police forces for internal security purposes to 
complement the usually unarmed “spy police”. In addition, the Nigerian government provided Shell with 
military security forces in connection with external security such as patrolling operational sites and 
pipelines.  
In this context, Shell was heavily criticized for its involvement in human rights violations and the 
cooperation with the military regime. Shell’s involvement in the Umuechem massacre in 1990 is a 
commonly cited example for the company’s overreliance on security. When local youths planned a 
peaceful protest against Shell in connection with the environmental degradation caused by the company's 
operations, Shell requested security protection from the Mobil Police Force, a unit that had killed two 
                                                 
16 Moreover, Shell has renewable energy activities. 
17 The SPDC is subsequently also referred to as Shell. When relevant, SPDC and the TNC Shell are distinguished. 
18 In addition to SPDC, Shell Nigeria comprises „Shell Nigeria Gas“ (SNG) and „Shell Nigeria Exploration and 
Production Company“ (SNEPCO). 
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people and destroyed numerous houses after having been called by the company three years before (Pegg 
1999: 476). During the protests, the security forces killed 80 unarmed demonstrators and destroyed 
hundreds of houses. A subsequent inquiry found that there was no immanent threat of attack and that 
protesters were unarmed and peaceful (Frynas 2000: 56).19 In addition to Shell’s involvement in 
Umuechem and other cases of human rights violations (Pegg 1999: 476-477), Shell has supported the 
repressive military regime. In 1994, for instance, the company has provided financial assistance for the 
establishment of the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force to curb anti-oil protests (Omeje 2006: 82). 
The task force was involved in extrajudicial killings and repression of the population. Moreover, Shell 
attempted to import weapons into Nigeria for the “spy police” in breach of an arms embargo between 
1993 and 1995. Human Rights Watch argued that the weapons on order “did not seem appropriate for 
protection from armed robbers and 'general crime'” (Human Rights Watch 1999: 160) as argued by Shell.  
As the conflict in the Niger Delta spread despite heavy government repression, particularly in the Ogoni 
territory, Shell suffered losses of some US$ 200 million (International Crisis Group 2008: 3). The 
company subsequently withdrew from the Ogoni territory in 1993 but continued operations in other parts 
of the Niger Delta.20 In addition to Shell’s reliance on security forces and the withdrawal from Ogoni 
territories, the company reacted to the protests through ad-hoc community programs and gifts. Since the 
1960s, Shell had pursued a Community Assistance approach that was essentially about “giving gifts to 
communities” (Zimmer 2010: 69). Local consent was purchased through cash payments, infrastructure or 
health care projects in a “pay-as-you-go” manner, leaving the communities without any substantial 
benefits (Idemudia 2011: 169). Therefore, this sporadic engagement is neither considered conflict-relevant 
nor as a governance contribution. With regard to compliance with national regulatory frameworks, Shell’s 
engagement paints a mixed picture. The company was accused of violations of national laws, especially 
concerning oil spillage and compensation (Omeje 2006: 93-96). Existing laws were not monitored and 
enforced either due to the limited capacity or lack of willingness on the part of the military regime 
(Idemudia 2010a: 140-142). As Shell’s partial compliance with environmental laws represent a 
continuation of previous behavior and was silently accepted by the government, it is considered “business 
as usual” rather than “taking advantage of public regulation gaps”.  
Taken together, Shell’s reliance on security, ad-hoc community projects and poor compliance with 
environmental laws demonstrate that faced with the conflict, the company continued its operations as 
usual and adopted short-term risk management strategies. It did not, however, attempt to provide security 
beyond its company premises and denied any “greater” social responsibility. In response to international 
appeals to act on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa’s death sentence, Shell clearly rejects taking on a more political 
role: 
“Some campaigning groups say we should intervene in the political process in Nigeria. But even if we 
could, we must never do so. Politics is the business of governments and politicians. The world where 
companies use their economic influence to prop up or bring down governments would be a 
frightening and bleak one indeed.” (Shell 1995) 
In subsequent years, Shell has reversed that position and its overall approach in the conflict from 
ignorance and securitization towards more responsive engagement that is geared towards security 
provision beyond the private good.  
                                                 
19 Shell contradicts this view (Detheridge/Pepple [Shell] 1998: 484-485). 
20 Shell’s withdrawal represents a different value on the dependent variable and is not part of „business as usual“. 
Nevertheless, “business as usual” remains the dominant mode of engagement in the conflict environment until 1997 
(see also Rieth/Zimmer 2004a: 21-23). 
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3.1.4.2 Corporate engagement towards peace and security  
Since 1997, Shell’s engagement in the Niger Delta conflict environment has undergone a substantial shift 
from “business as usual” to engagement towards peace and security. Shell demonstrates both direct 
security engagement that reaches beyond the company itself and indirect contributions to security through 
conflict-relevant and conflict-sensitive engagement in other policy fields. On the direct security dimension, 
Shell’s engagement towards the protection of human right stands out as a notable shift from previous 
positions and activities. In 1997, Shell published a revised version of the company’s General Business 
Principles that included for the first time a commitment to society for the “support for fundamental 
human rights in line with the legitimate role of business” (Shell 1997: n.p.). Moreover, Shell has 
participated in the development of the VPs in 2000 and subsequently incorporated the standards in the 
company’s Group Security Standards. Shell has taken steps to include the VPs in all security contracts and 
provided training for the implementation of the standards (Shell 2010: 21). In Nigeria, Shell has trained 
both state and private security forces in this regard. Furthermore, 4,720 staff, contractors and community 
leaders have received a Human Rights and Conflict Resolution training as of April 2012 (Shell 2012c). In 
addition to the VPs, Shell has committed to human rights standards in the framework of the UNCG since 
2000. Shell’s engagement towards human rights constitutes a governance contribution because the 
voluntary commitments have a long-term perspective and go beyond both basic business needs. 
Moreover, Shell’s engagement reaches beyond the private good as the company trains other private and 
public security forces on human rights issues. The neighboring communities, specifically peaceful 
protesters, are expected to be beneficiaries of the policies. Thus, security is envisioned in a larger sense 
beyond the protection of company staff and property.21  
On the public order dimension, Shell is further engaged in the promotion of transparency and the rule of 
law. In the company’s General Business Principles and Code of Conduct, Shell has committed to anti-
corruption standards based on EITI and the Transparency International Business Principles on 
Countering Bribery. Moreover, Shell has supported the global EITI as a founder and board member. In 
Nigeria, Shell actively supported the Nigerian Extractive Industries Initiative (NEITI) launched in 2003 as 
a member of the Board and the National Stakeholder Working Group, as well as through advocacy and 
sponsoring (Shell 2009). Although publishing company data is mandatory for corporations in Nigeria 
since 2007, the active support by Shell represents a voluntary governance contribution. Critics argue that 
NEITI is inadequate to achieve proclaimed goals (e.g. Asgill 2012; Shaxson 2009). Feil et al. (2008: 28), 
however, note that “the effect of EITI [NEITI] on the political debate and processes should not be 
underestimated”. Shell’s durable engagement towards greater transparency reaches beyond the private 
good as it promotes transparency not only in the company, but also in the public sphere. It is considered 
conflict-relevant because corruption and self-accumulation were salient factors both for grievance-induced 
violence and oil-bunkering activities. Furthermore, there is a conflict-sensitive dimension in the 
multistakholder initiative NEITI as it comprises a procedural approach of decision-making by including 
representatives of civil society, government and the oil industry.  
On the socioeconomic dimension, Shell has instigated a significant shift in its approach towards local 
communities in 1997. It aborted the Community Assistance strategy and implemented a Community 
Development approach. It was laid out to be more participatory so that communities are involved in 
                                                 
21 An unintended side-effect of Shell’s engagement is that in order to reduce the reliance on the repressive state 
security forces, Shell has increasingly employed community-based groups, particularly youths, as private security 
contractors. This approach has fueled competition for territorial control among local youths and mixing with 
insurgents (Omeje 2006: 92; Zalik 2009: 569), therefore increasing the risk of conflict. 
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identifying needs and priorities, as well as in the implementation phase. Furthermore, a joint investigation 
process was supposed to investigate oil spills and determine appropriate compensation. The new 
approach, however, “proved to be a chimera” (Watts 2005: 399). The projects were neither sustainable nor 
participatory and spurred intra- and inter-community violence in competition over benefits (Idemudia 
2010b: 836). Against this background, Shell introduced a third community development model in 2004, 
based on the ideals of partnership, namely the Sustainable Community Development approach. At the 
heart of this approach are Global Memorandums of Understanding (GMoUs) between Shell and a group 
of communities. According to Shell (2012a: n.p.), this represents “an important shift in approach, placing 
emphasis on more transparent and accountable processes, regular communication with the grassroots, 
sustainability and conflict prevention”. By the end of 2011, Shell had signed GMoUs with 27 community 
clusters, covering over 290 communities equaling about 30 percent of communities around the company's 
operations (Shell 2012a). The governing body of the GMoUs is the Cluster Development Board 
comprised of community members and representatives from Shell, the state and other development 
actors, thereby offering aggrieved communities a platform to voice their ideas and demands through non-
violent mechanisms. Moreover, the approach of the GMoUs intends to reduce conflicts among 
neighboring communities. The Managing Director of the SPDC, Basil Omiyi, explains:  
“We have decided to adopt the system of signing GMOUs with communities. This is an agreement 
with a group of communities rather than a particular one. In this case some of the communities are 
closer to our facilities while others are not, at the end all of them benefit and development would be 
enhanced.” (cited in Idemudia 2009: 109). 
Critics acknowledge that the GMoU approach “is a substantial improvement on previous SPDC 
community engagement strategies”, but note that so far it has only “enjoyed a limited degree of success” 
(ECCR 2010: 75). In addition to community development through GMoUs, Shell promotes development 
programs on health, education, business development and youth development in the Niger Delta. Having 
identified (youth) unemployment as a conflict factor earlier, Shell’s engagement in the area of youth and 
business development can be considered conflict-relevant. Programs cover the promotion of micro credit 
finance and training for young entrepreneurs and vocational and skills training. Both the durable GMoU 
approach, aimed at promoting sustainable development, and Shell’s long-term engagement towards youth 
employment and business development constitute conflict-relevant governance contributions. 
Furthermore, the GMoU pursues a conflict-sensitive approach by institutionalizing participatory decision-
making structures for host communities and including a wider group of communities.   
With regard to the environment, Shell’s behavior remains ambivalent. Shell asserts that it “remains 
committed to minimising the impacts of its operations and activities on the environment” (Shell 2007: 12). 
While Shell has committed to the ISO 14001 Environmental Management System standard 22 and 
regularly publishes data on oil spills, the majority of its commitments regarding the environment refer to 
compliance with the national regulatory framework (Shell 2007: 12-13). Although they are therefore largely 
involuntary commitments, the successful implementation of national regulation could be considered 
notable as the Nigerian state appears largely unable or unwilling to enforce existing environmental 
regulations. However, Shell’s environmental compliance record, particularly with regard to oil spills, is 
contested among stakeholders and academic research (e.g. Idemudia 2009: 109-110; Omeje 2006: 93-96; 
Steiner 2010). Conflicts between Shell and local communities continue over pollution, sabotage and 
adequate compensation, even in court cases of Shell’s home state. In January 2013, for instance, a Dutch 
                                                 
22 The standard specifies different requirements for an environmental management system. 
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court found the company guilty of oil pollution while dismissing four other cases caused by criminal 
activity (Nwachukwu et al. 2013). Consequently, Shell’s engagement with regard to the environment does 
not constitute a governance contribution but is conceptualized as “business as usual”. Rather than creating 
a positive value towards peace and security, Shell’s behavior stabilizes existing conflict lines. On the 
sociocultural dimension, Shell does not exhibit notable engagement. Altogether, however, Shell’s 
engagement in the Niger Delta conflict environment has undergone a visible shift from “business as 
usual” to engagement towards peace and security. While the impact of Shell’s engagement in the conflict 
environment is not yet systematically analyzed, the company has demonstrated security-related, conflict-
relevant and conflict-sensitive approaches through its human rights and security policies, the support of 
anti-corruption and transparency standards and community and private sector development programs. 
The next section analyzes the conditions for this shift. 
 3.1.5 Explaining Shell’s engagement  
At first sight, Shell’s engagement in peace and security relates directly to the conflict environment. As 
indicated earlier, the company suffered large costs from instability in the region. First, Shell suffered 
economic costs from the shutdown of operations in the Ogoni territory (Omeje 2006: 81). In 2006, Shell 
also temporarily closed down operations in the western delta due to a series of attacks (Shell 2012d). In 
the recent past, Shell increasingly lost revenues due to oil theft and sabotage. Shell estimates that 
approximately 150,000 barrels are lost to oil theft per day (Shell 2012d). In response to repeated theft at a 
pipeline in 2011 and 2012, the SPDC Managing Director, Mutiu Sunmonou, noted: “It is difficult to 
sustain production in the circumstance as we have to shut down when a facility trips and fix the cause 
before restarting” (Shell 2012b: n.p.). Kidnappings represent another security risk for the company. 
Between 2006 and 2011, over 200 SPDC staff and contractors have been taken hostage, several of which 
have been killed in the course of the kidnappings (Shell 2010; Shell 2012d; Shell n.d.c). Shell’s vulnerability 
towards such security risks and related costs is linked to the company’s production characteristics in the 
Niger Delta. The size and spread of Shell’s facilities across the delta, notable pipelines, make them 
vulnerable to protests and violence (Zimmer 2010: 74). Shell was directly exposed to violence, not only as 
a bystander but also as a target, and suffered direct costs through production cuts and kidnappings. While 
this exposure to the conflict explains why Shell has an increased interest in security for the company, it 
cannot sufficiently explain why Shell would engage in the provision of security as a collective good. As a 
matter of fact, Shell suffered economic costs in both phases of engagement, although the cost of 
insecurity rose significantly after 2003 when Shell increasingly became the target of violent attacks, 
kidnappings and crime. Hence, other factors need to be considered. 
 The main push factors for Shell's strategic shift was transnational civil society activism. Similar to 
many other scholars, Ite (2007: 9) concludes: “Shell in Nigeria has had to re-evaluate and change its 
policies as a result of the influence of both Nigerian and international NGOs.” In the wake of the Ogoni 
crisis, civil society actors heavily criticized Shell's repressive behavior and drew attention to the company's 
role in human rights violations. MOSOP's demands were supported by other communities and youths 
(Zimmer 2010: 76). More importantly for the movement, however, MOSOP was successful in lobbying 
for its cause on the international level. MOSOP had substantial resources, largely thanks to Ken Saro-
Wiwa's personal wealth, that paid for lobbying trips to Europe and North America (Bob 2002: 404). Due 
to Ken Saro-Wiwa's international recognition as a writer, MOSOP was also well connected to important 
NGOs and the media. After initial difficulties in publicizing their cause, MOSOP's framing around 
environmental issues gained the support of key players such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth and 
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Shell increasingly became the target of international protests (Bob 2002). In the course of increasing 
repression of protests, human rights organizations followed suit. International NGOs led coordinated 
campaigns around Shell’s role in the Ogoni territory and raised the attention of the media. As Ken Saro-
Wiwa and the other MOSOP leaders were put on trial and executed, international protests against Shell 
reached a climax, “not a day passed without media attention focused on the Shell company” (Haller et al. 
2007: 88). In the same year as the execution, Shell was also put under increasing civil society and media 
pressure for the company's plan to dispose of the Brent Spar oil storage buoy. In addition to reputational 
costs suffered as a result of international naming and shaming campaigns and media attention, Shell risked 
significant material costs as international embargos and sanctions against Nigeria were expected (Haller et 
al. 2007: 88).   
 Against this background, Shell saw the need to respond and review its policies. The Chairman of 
the Committee of Managing Directors, Mark Moody-Stuart, stated: “Shell is undergoing fundamental 
change […]. We have learned the hard way that we must listen, engage and respond to our stakeholder 
groups” (cited in Frynas 2003: 280). In addition to a global advertising campaign, Shell started a worldwide 
dialogue forum to explore the reputation and standing of the company and improve its understanding of 
the changing societal expectation (Rieth/Zimmer 2004a: 24). Furthermore, Shell initiated a dialogue with 
major NGOs. Managing external perceptions of the company became a crucial element of Shell's business 
strategy and lead to the adoption of CSR policies in different fields. In the first Sustainability Report Shell 
states: 
“We care about what you think of us. We want you to know more about how we work and how we 
strive to live up to our principles. This report is part of a dialogue, and we will continue to seek your 
views” (Shell 1998: 1) 
In this vein, Shell also aimed to address local perceptions and secure a “social license to operate” (e.g. 
Idemudia 2010b: 834) by opening negotiations with MOSOP and reviewing the company's community 
development program to include, among other elements, participatory structures for communities and 
platforms for dialogue.  
Overall, the shift towards CSR policies at both the global and local levels have improved the corporate 
image. Shell is now recognized as a world leader in corporate social responsibility (Frynas 2009: 7). 
However, this does not mean that Shell is no longer criticized. Transnational civil society organizations 
still confront the company with its negative impacts on stakeholders and the environment, also in Nigeria. 
In the Clean the Niger Delta campaign, for example, Amnesty International mobilized 300,000 signatures 
that were publically delivered to Shell Headquarters in 2012 (Amnesty International 2013: 6). 
Furthermore, civil society organizations supported litigation efforts, as in the case Wiwa vs. Shell23 or the 
lawsuit against Shell for environmental pollution brought forward in The Hague. Such confrontational 
strategies serve to hold Shell accountable on self-proclaimed standards and beyond. Increasingly, 
transnational civil society organizations also apply more collaborative strategies, for instance, by partnering 
with Shell. The global initiatives EITI, VPs or the UNGC represent multistakeholder initiatives that 
include both civil society organizations and Shell. Moreover, Shell has cooperated with international 
NGOs in the Niger Delta. The UK-based NGO Living Earth assisted Shell in the revision of the 
community development strategy and the implementation process. Shell hoped to benefit from this 
partnership through NGO expertise and increased legitimacy on the ground. On the global level, the 
                                                 
23 The Wiwa family sued Shell for complicity in human right abuses under the Alien Torts Claim Act in 1995. In 
2009, the case was settled with a payment of US$ 15.5 million.  
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partnership is part of Shell’s management of the external perception of Shell’s community strategy (Heap 
2000). In sum, transnational civil society activism was a crucial factor for Shell’s policy shift in the Niger 
Delta and beyond. Moreover, confrontational and collaborative civil society activism provided incentives 
for peace and security related CSR policies and governance contributions in the Niger Delta through (the 
threat of) financial and reputational costs, as well as efficiency and reputation-related benefits. Hence, 
Shell’s reputation-sensitivity as a global brand with a large share of downstream activities, making the 
company visible to consumers, features as an important factor (Zimmer 2010: 71).  
The availability of an enabling environment in Nigeria has also been a factor that can, in part, account for 
Shell’s engagement towards peace and security. Shortly after Shell had initiated a policy shift in the conflict 
environment, the Nigerian state underwent a political transition. In 1998, General Sani Abacha, who had 
ruled the country since 1993, died of heart failure and was replaced by General Abdulsalami Abubaka. The 
military leader initiated a guided transition to civilian rule and democracy after 30 years of military rule, 
with several implications for Shell’s engagement in the conflict. The most notable change occurred with 
regard to the government’s willingness to provide peace and security as a public good. The capacity of the 
government to implement governance unilaterally, however, remained largely unchanged or decreased 
slightly. During military rule, the historically weak political institutions were further hollowed out, resulting 
in a reduced capacity to provide security and other public goods (Ibeanu/Luckham 2007: 45). Under the 
Abacha regime from 1993 until 1998, military repression kept the Ogoni resistance in check but did not 
provide security at large. Rather, part of the violence was “state-induced” (Ibeanu/Luckham 2007: 61). 
This indicates that despite its weakness, the state had at least a partial capacity to exercise its monopoly of 
violence. With the transition to democracy, governmental repression was reduced and applied more 
selectively. As a result, “the public security may even have widened under civilian governance” 
(Ibeanu/Luckham 2007: 84). According to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), Nigeria’s 
monopoly on the use of force now is limited in some regions and the larger cities. Nigeria is further 
characterized by a sophisticated administration system, whereby only the federal and state government 
execute real power (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012b: 5-6).24 With regard to the oil industry, the government 
regulation and oversight has expanded, but, in practice, enforcement remains limited (Idemudia 2010a: 
140-141). Against this background, Nigeria’s capacity to implement governance unilaterally is considered 
medium-range. It exhibited at least a medium “shadow of hierarchy” in tightening the oversight of the oil 
industry, although there is no evidence of the threat mechanism with regard to governance contributions 
towards peace and security. Furthermore, the state is neither too strong to discourage companies to 
become engaged, nor too weak to be a reliable partner.  
The county’s willingness to provide public goods on the whole, and peace and security in particular, has 
changed notably with the transition to democracy. Under military rule, the state’s repression and policy 
towards the Niger Delta fuelled grievances that represent root causes of the conflict. Since 1999, the 
government has initiated different policies and implemented activities to tackle the conflict and foster 
peace. A measure that relates directly to the level of violence is the amnesty offered to insurgents in 2009. 
It reduced the level of violence to a certain extent (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012b: 23). There are also various 
policies that address the conflict in the Niger Delta indirectly. In contrast to the military regime, for 
example, democratic governments have fostered a public debate about the links between oil, conflict and 
development (Ibeanu/Luckham 2007: 83). Moreover, the democratic government of President Obasanjo 
                                                 
24 In the past BTI ratings since 2006, Nigeria’s monopoly on the use of force and basic administration scored 5 
(except for Nigeria’s basic administration score of 4 in 2006), with 1 being the lowest and 10 the highest 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012c) 
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promoted transparency and anti-corruption policies through the adoption of EITI, the review of public 
procurement processes and the creation of an Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Shaxson 
2009: 9). Finally, the government has also started to address the issue of revenue allocation. In 1999, the 
percentage of oil revenues accruing to oil-producing state was increased from 3 to 13 percent. These 
initiatives indicate that the state is willing to address at least some of the root causes of the conflict. So far, 
the policies and activities have not achieved their proclaimed aims. Corruption, poverty and violence 
persist. In the Niger Delta, the government still remains largely absent, which is why communities 
increasingly look to oil companies for the provision of public goods (Rosenau et al. 2009: 16).  
Despite these limitations, the changed position of the government has, in part, created an enabling 
environment for Shell’s engagement towards peace and security. On the one hand, the government has 
fostered CSR policies through partnerships with Shell, for example, in the framework of EITI or GMoUs. 
For Shell, this partnership with the state can bring increased legitimacy to CSR frameworks. Moreover, it 
is a means to “share” the responsibility. On the other hand, the policies and activities of the state towards 
peace and security provide the opportunity for Shell to pursue its own policy shift after 1997. 
Commenting on the return to civilian rule and the increasing opportunities for the freedom of speech and 
the respect of human rights, Shell notes: “Shell companies in Nigeria welcome this change, and we 
continue to contribute any we can to ensure that these opportunities are used in the continuous 
improvement of our relationship with host communities” (Shell n.d.a: n.p.). In contrast, the 
implementation of such policies against a military regime notorious for human rights violations would 
have proved much more difficult.  
In addition to transnational civil society activism, which greatly influenced Shell’s policy shift in Nigeria 
and on the global level, and the favorable conditions in the host state environment after the transition to 
civilian rule, Shell’s specific experience in the Niger Delta has played an important role. The company 
experienced that the repressive security policies at the beginning of the 1990s were unsuccessful and 
rather aggravated the conflict, therefore increasing the cost of business in the region. Shell’s Regional 
Communication Manager for West Africa admits: “[W]e’ve made mistakes in the past, but we have learned 
from them” (Shell 2011: n.p.). Furthermore, Shell’s policy shift in Nigeria has to be considered in the 
wider company policy. The hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other MOSOP member and the Brent Spar 
incident were central events that pushed Shell to initiate a global policy change, on different fields of 
engagement and in different countries. While the experience in the context of the Niger Delta conflict 
were catalytic for an overall move towards CSR, the strategy for Nigeria is now part of a wider, evolved 
CSR policy that is part of Shell’s business strategy. 
3.2 BP’s engagement in Azerbaijan 
The following sections analyze BP’s engagement in the conflict environment of Azerbaijan from 1992, 
when BP started business in the country, until 2013 and investigate the conditions of BP’s engagement 
towards peace and security. In order to understand the operating environment and identify relevant 
corporate contributions towards peace and security, the next sections explore the conflict background. 
Thereafter, a short profile of BP provides important background information on the company and its 
production in the country.  
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3.2.1 The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and internal tensions 
The conflict over Nagorno Karabakh (see Appendix: Figure 2) goes back to the end of the First World 
War, although it only developed into a war following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The 
conflict is essentially about the status of the region of Nagorno Karabakh, which was made an 
autonomous region within the Azerbaijani Republic by the Soviet Union in 1921, although it was mainly 
populated by ethnic Armenians. The appeal of the regional Soviet of Nagorno Karabakh in 1988 to join 
Armenia fuelled Armenian and Azerbaijani national movements. While the Azerbaijani claim that the 
region is part of their territory, Armenia and the ethnic Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh insist on the 
principle of self-determination. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the conflict 
descended into a war that caused between 22,000 and 25,000 deaths and over one million refugees and 
internally displaced persons (International Crisis Group 2007: 1). As a result of the fighting, which took 
place primarily between 1992 and 1994, Armenian forces occupied Nagorno Karabakh and conquered 
adjacent Azerbaijani territory. In May 1994, a ceasefire was brokered between Azerbaijan, Armenia and 
the authorities of Nagorno Karabakh by Russia and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) 25. Since then, the conflict remains “frozen”. Nevertheless, tensions remain high and 
violent incidents occur on a regular basis along the line of contact, a 180-kilometer long and highly 
militarized zone along the de-facto border of Nagorno Karabakh with approximately 20,000 to 30,000 
troops on either side (Davis 2013: 56), and the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Approximately 
30 people, mostly soldiers but also civilians, are killed in the clashes annually (International Crisis Group 
2011: 1). A mediation process between the conflict parties is facilitated by the so-called Minsk Group of 
the OSCE, which is co-chaired by Russia, France and the USA.26 So far, however, peace efforts, such as 
the talks in Moscow in 2008 and the Prague Process between 2004 and 2005 have failed to reach a 
settlement. In the recent past, peace talks have ceased while the clashes have increased. Ceasefire 
violations rose by 53 percent in 2010 (International Crisis Group 2011: 3). The International Crisis Group 
(2011: 3) warns that tit-for-tat attacks risk an escalation of the conflict. Moreover, Armenia and Azerbaijan 
amplify belligerent rhetoric and pursue an arms race, fuelled by Azerbaijani oil and gas revenues and 
Russia’s support for Armenia. Taken together, there appears to be a serious risk of war, possibly with a 
regional dimension (Merry 2013). 
 In addition to the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, there is a conflict between various opposition 
groups and the Azerbaijani state since 2003 (HIIK 2012). Violent protests erupted around the presidential 
and parliamentary elections in 2003 and 2005. According to Human Rights Watch (2004; 2005), protests 
were met with brutal force, detentions and arrests. In 2003, security forces killed at least one protester 
(Human Rights Watch 2004). Repression through violence and intimidation of oppositional rallies has 
become a common means of political control, also outside the context of elections (International Crisis 
Group 2010a: 13). Throughout 2011 and 2012, protests against the government and state repression 
continued. While secular opposition groups, including political parties, are the dominant actors, there have 
also been violent clashes between Islamist groups and security forces (Sultanova 2012). The political 
objectives of opposition groups are diverse, but the majority of activism is directed against government 
corruption, repression and electoral fraud.  
                                                 
25 Previously Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). 
26 Prior to 1997, Russia was the sole chair of the group.  
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3.2.2 Root causes and key issues 
The roots of the conflict around Nagorno Karabakh go back far in history, or rather the interpretation 
thereof. There are contradictory national narratives from both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Both sides believe 
that Nagorno Karabakh constitutes an essential part of their national identity. This relates to a broader 
sensation of insecurity of the countries, fuelled by historical experiences (De Waal 2005: 12-13). With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, opportunity structures became available that “facilitated a large social 
mobilization in the society, which, however, did not have clear channels of mediation or mechanisms of 
dialogue among the conflicting parties” (Gahramanova 2007: 3). Ethnicity played a strong role in the 
mobilization of the societies by nationalist elites (Geukjian 2012: 7). Furthermore, the breakdown of 
military discipline in the Soviet Union made weapons available to the conflict parties (Cornell 2002: 46).  
In addition to the conflict background and related factors, there are several factors that have contributed 
to existing tensions and inhibited a peaceful resolution after 1994. Azerbaijan’s oil wealth has played an 
important role in this regard. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan has pursued a 
development strategy primarily based on oil and gas. With the expansion of production, the share of oil 
and gas revenues in total government revenues grew from 23 percent in 1999 to over 50 percent in 2012 
(EIU 2013: 4; Meissner 2010: 18). Azerbaijan is now highly dependent on these revenues. The 
government of president Ilham Aliyev has used the country’s oil wealth for increased defense spending. 
Military spending rose from US$ 175 million in 2004 to US$ 3.1 billion in 2011 (German 2012: 218). 
Growing oil revenues and, more recently also gas revenues, have therefore fuelled the arms race with 
Armenia and led to the belief that Azerbaijan can shift the balance of power in its favor (International 
Crisis Group 2011: 6). According to the president, a military solution of the conflict is not ruled out: “The 
purpose in allocating significant resources to army building […] is that if the negotiations prove 
unsuccessful, then our lands must be liberated by a military option” (Aliyev 2010).  
A second conflict factor, related to Azerbaijan’s oil wealth, is the government’s revenue management and 
inability to deal with corruption and governance issues. Mismanagement of revenues and corruption may 
result in greater domestic instability, which, in turn, creates incentives for “diversionary military aggression 
in Nagorno Karabakh” (Shankleman 2006: 83). Along with the oil boom, Azerbaijan has experienced 
classic symptoms of “Dutch Disease”. Other sectors, such as agriculture, have been neglected by the 
government and become less competitive (Boonstra et al. 2008: 2). To counter this development, a State 
Oil Fund (SOFAZ) has been established in 1999 that preserves revenues for future generations. However, 
there is little transparency and democratic control over the fund, and more generally over the management 
of revenues. Corruption is an endemic problem and deeply entrenched in the political culture. Oil 
revenues are used for personal enrichment and as an instrument of patronage (Kaldor 2007: 169-170). 
Moreover, the country is characterized by a semi-authoritarian political structure and (violent) repression 
of the opposition (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a). While these conditions foster grievances among the 
population, they are also conducive for violence as an instrument of opposition. Kaldor (2007: 171) 
concludes that “the formal democratic process does not offer mechanisms to challenge Aliyev’s rule or, 
indeed, to reform the political system. As a consequence, conflict, both in emphasizing the Karabakh 
bargaining chip and actual violence, is the main way in which opposition groups can compete for power”.  
The role of external players in the conflict, notably Russia’s engagement, is considered another obstacle 
for the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The most important external actors, Russia, 
the US, Turkey and Iran, all have significant geopolitical stakes in the region, with several implications for 
the conflict (Ismailzade 2005). It is argued that Russian traditionalists are not interested in a peace 
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settlement because they want to maintain the conflict as political leverage for Russian interest in the region 
(Kaldor 2007: 175). Moreover, Russia has rendered political and military support to Armenia in a close 
alliance, fuelling the arms race between the countries. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, has received support 
from its ally Turkey, whose relations with Armenia are severely strained. Similarly to the alliance between 
Russia and Armenia, the close partnership between Azerbaijan and Turkey “reinforces mutual mistrust 
and suspicion over Nagorno-Karabakh, hindering the prospect of a negotiated settlement to the conflict” 
(German 2012: 222). The alliances also fuel fears of an internationalization of the conflict. In sum, 
historical tensions, nationalist sentiments and the special circumstances provided by the collapse of the 
Soviet Union can be considered root causes of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In addition, Azerbaijan’s 
dependence on oil, corruption, repression and geopolitical interests in the region are obstacles to the 
solution of the conflict and, in part, fuel the internal conflict in Azerbaijan. Consequently, direct conflict 
intervention could foster a negotiated settlement, for example through interregional cooperation. On the 
socioeconomic dimension, indirect contributions to peace and security could address the country’s oil 
dependence and revenue management. Moreover, on the political order dimension, a reduction of 
governmental repression and corruption, particularly with regard to oil and gas revenues, as well as 
increased political freedom, would reduce internal tensions and the risk of a violent escalation of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. On the sociocultural dimension, national and ethnic divides as well as 
mistrust could be addressed as a means to foster regional peace. 
3.2.3 Company profile 
BP is a British multinational company active in the oil and gas industry, covering both upstream and 
downstream activities.27 The company employs over 83,000 people, has 21,800 retail sites and operates in 
more than 80 countries (BP 2012a: 30-31, 107). With an annual revenue of US$ 368.4 billion in 2011, BP 
ranks fourth among the 500 largest companies in the world (Fortune 2012). BP first started business in 
Azerbaijan in 1992. The company operates under several different production sharing and host 
government agreements. In 1994, the Azeri-Chirag-Deepwater Gunashli (ACG) production sharing 
agreement, also referred to as the “contract of the century”, was signed. Within the consortium of the 
Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC), BP, other international oil companies and the State 
Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) soon developed three major oil fields in the Caspian 
Sea. The first oil was produced in 1997 and in 2008 the entire ACG field became operational. The oil is 
exported through different pipelines via Russia, Georgia and Turkey to different destinations, including 
the European Union. BP operates the Western Route Export Pipeline via Georgia and the Baku-Tiblisi-
Ceyhan Pipeline through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean Coast, which only became fully 
operational in 2006, through the BTC Pipeline Company. BP has further developed the Shaz Deniz gas 
field with consortium partners SOCAR, Statoil and others. The first gas was pumped and transported in 
2006 via the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) to Turkey, which runs parallel to the BTC pipeline. Currently, 
BP is also exploring and developing several other oil and gas fields.28 With these activities, BP is the 
leading foreign oil and gas company in Azerbaijan and its investments in Azerbaijan represent one of the 
largest foreign operations of the company (Gulbrandsen/Moe 2007: 6). It is the operator and the largest 
shareholder of ACG, BTC, and Shah Deniz/SCP.29 BP employs over 2,700 staff of which 86% were 
                                                 
27 In addition, BP has renewable energy activities. 
28 Chirag Oil Project, Shafag-Asiman structure, Shah Deniz Stage 2.  
29 Within the Shah Deniz/SCP project, BP and Statoil both own 25.5% of the shares. BP’s share in ACG is 37.4% 
and 30.1% in the BTC project (BP 2012c: 16).  
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Azerbaijani citizens in 2011 (BP 2012c: 16). While the oil and gas operations of BP are based offshore, the 
company’s processing terminal and vast pipeline routes are based on land (see Appendix: Figure 3). The 
routes also pass near Nagorno Karabakh. 
3.2.4 BP’s engagement in the conflict environment of Azerbaijan 
BP’s engagement in the conflict environment of Azerbaijan gradually developed into a wider engagement 
towards peace and security. In the high intensity conflict phase between 1992 and 1994, BP displayed no 
engagement towards the conflict at all. This can be attributed to the early stage of business operations in 
the country. In 1992, BP had just opened its first office in Baku. Two years later, BP signed the first major 
contract with Azerbaijan. Especially during negotiations with the newly independent country and other 
international oil companies within the turmoil of political events,30 BP can be expected to have avoided 
politically sensitive issues. With the subsequent development of business operations in the country, BP 
developed and expanded CSR policies and governance contributions within different policy fields, also 
towards peace and security.  
BP does not address the level of violence through direct interventions in the conflict. The company’s 
engagement, however, contributes to peace and security indirectly through other policy fields and conflict-
sensitive engagement. On the political order dimension, BP addresses corruption. At the global level, BP 
has committed to anti-corruption and transparency standards in its Code of Conduct, based on EITI, 
UNGC and the Transparency International Business Principles on Countering Bribery. Indeed, BP is an 
active supporter and member of the steering committee of the latter initiative. In Azerbaijan, BP has 
played a leading organizational role in the EITI process since its inception in 2003. Among other, BP has 
cooperated closely with civil society organizations to enhance their knowledge and thereby improve 
external monitoring capabilities (Webb/Carstens 2008: 17). BP’s own transparency engagement surpasses 
EITI requirements and the policies of other oil companies. Together with Statoil, BP is the only oil 
company that releases revenue and tax payment information in Azerbaijan. BP’s transparency in 
Azerbaijan also goes further than in other countries (Crude Accountability 2012: 17). Anti-corruption 
policies are, for instance, expanded onto BP’s suppliers. Moreover, the company has demonstrated a 
transparent approach with regard to the construction of the BTC pipeline (Elkind 2005: 55-58). Although 
corruption remains an ever-present problem in Azerbaijan and critics believe the company is not using its 
leverage over the government sufficiently (Gulbrandsen/Moe 2007: 7), it is evident that BP has taken up 
“a leading role in anti-corruption behaviour in Azerbaijan” (ASRC 2011: 10), which could have a catalyst 
effect on political processes in the country. BP’s durable and visible anti-corruption and transparency 
engagement constitutes a governance contribution because it reaches beyond the private good by 
addressing the government, civil society and suppliers. The engagement is considered conflict-relevant as 
corruption was previously identified as a factor in the conflict between the government and opposition 
groups and a risk factor in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  
Concerning the socio-economic dimension, BP’s support for a revenue management scheme relates 
indirectly to peace and security. BP has cooperated with the government of Azerbaijan to facilitate advice 
on economic planning and the management of oil revenues and the oil fund SOFAZ. For example, BP 
supported SOFAZ in the development of a macroeconomic model aimed at strengthening the 
government’s capacity to mange oil revenues in line with Azerbaijan’s State Program on Poverty 
                                                 
30 In addition to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the government was politically unstable. During the negotiations, 
the former president of Azerbaijan, Abulfaz Elchibey, was overthrown in a military coup and replaced by Heydar 
Aliyev. Aliyev immediately cancelled a first contract with BP and other oil companies in 1993.  
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Reduction and Economic Development. Among other things, the program aims to ensure 
macroeconomic stability and balanced economic growth through the development of the non-oil sector 
(IMF 2003). BP has further convened workshops and supported an informal advisory group on revenue 
management and economic diversification (BP 2005: 10). BP’s microfinance program and business 
enabling environment project constitute other contributions to the development of the non-oil business 
sector.31 Aimed at promoting sustainable and balanced economic growth across Azerbaijan, BP’s durable 
activities are considered governance contributions. They constitute conflict-relevant engagement because 
they are aimed at economic diversification in a country that relies heavily on oil and gas revenues. As laid 
out earlier, large oil and gas revenues have stabilized a repressive and corrupt government and fed into an 
increasingly militarized policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
With regard to conflict-sensitive governance contributions, BP’s engagement around the construction of 
the BTC and South Caucasus pipelines stands out. Security and human rights policies and activities, 
particularly in the interaction with local communities, are aimed at reducing the potential for escalating 
conflict. On the global scale, BP has signed and implemented both the standards of the VPs and the 
UNGC. Moreover, BP has committed to the UN Guiding Principles on Human Rights and commissioned 
three experts to assess existing policies and activities in view of alignment with the Guiding Principles. 
The commitment to human rights is reflected within the company code of conduct. BP has developed 
guidelines to facilitate the implementation of human rights and security standards (BP 2006; 2008). In 
Azerbaijan, BP has undertaken several steps to implement the VPs, particularly in the context of the 
construction of the BTC and South Caucasus pipelines. Private security forces guarding the pipelines, for 
example, are required to adhere to the VPs. BP has also trained public security forces on human rights 
issues since 2004. To avoid conflict with local communities surrounding the pipelines, BP has engaged in a 
dialogue with community stakeholders regarding, among other things, the security arrangements. From 
2006 until 2009, BP held over 250 community meetings. Furthermore, the company has established 
emergency phone lines for affected communities and individuals to report human rights abuses or the use 
of force (BP 2012b). External monitoring found the BTC and SCP projects “in material compliance with 
the Voluntary Principles, and setting global industry standards for effective implementation of this 
initiative” (Smith 2008: 1).32 Other conflict-sensitive mechanisms incorporated in BTC and projects 
include environmental and social impact assessments, external monitoring and consultations with 
stakeholders prior to the construction of the pipelines. BP’s engagement with regard to security and 
human rights and other conflict-sensitive engagement in its operations in Azerbaijan are considered 
governance contributions because of their voluntary nature, long-term perspective and reach beyond basic 
business needs. Targeting local communities and involving both private and public security forces who are 
criticized for their brutal response to protests, the engagement also reaches beyond the private good. The 
policies and activities are directed at preventing violence and conflict with surrounding communities in an 
unstable environment, not far from the region of Nagorno Karabakh. They “aim to avoid becoming a 
catalyst for ethnic or other conflict” (BTC Co. et al. 2003: 20). In its commitment to “[n]o accidents, no 
harm, to people, and no damage to the environment” (Republic of Azerbaijan et al. 2003), the BTC 
project is clearly characterized by a do-no-harm approach. 
                                                 
31 BP has several other business development programs, which are, however, largely directed at developing local 
suppliers in the oil and gas industry. Community employment promotion near BP’s operations is also not considered 
significantly relevant for non-oil sector development.  
32 Following the evaluation of the VP’s implementation in 2010, BP decided to halt external monitoring. 




On other dimensions, BP does not engage towards peace and security. The company neither addresses the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the internal conflict directly, nor does it address nationalism or ethnicity 
as conflict factors on the sociocultural dimension. Existing regional cooperation programs with 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey exclude Armenia and Russia and, therefore, do not constitute conflict-
relevant engagement. Notwithstanding these limitations, BP contributes to peace and security through 
conflict-relevant engagement with regard to corruption and oil dependency, as well as conflict-sensitive 
(human rights and security) policies, particularly toward local communities. The next section focuses on 
the conditions explaining BP’s engagement towards peace and security. 
3.2.5 Explaining BP’s engagement 
The conflict environment in Azerbaijan has not created direct costs for BP so far. BP’s offshore 
installations are far away from Nagorno-Karabakh and clashes between the government and oppositional 
groups. The pipelines, however, pass as close as 15 kilometers by the de-facto border of Nagorno-
Karabakh. Due to its economic significance to the government of Azerbaijan, the pipelines could easily 
become targets in an escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. “[M]ajor conflict could lead to 
significant and potentially prolonged problems with the pipeline operation and even oil production, with 
serious impacts on the returns” (Mansley 2003: 15). Hence, the pipelines’ proximity to the conflict region 
carries a substantial risk for BP. This vulnerability to violence results from production characteristics of 
BP’s operations in Azerbaijan, notably the spread and location of the pipelines, which are susceptible to 
sabotage or violent attacks. The company is aware of the conflict risk and the potential damages (CSR 
Network 2003: 20), which explains its interest in measures aimed at preventing a violent escalation of 
conflict in the first place. While this preference plausibly explains BP’s conflict-sensitive engagement 
around the pipelines near Nagorno-Karabakh, it cannot sufficiently explain the wide-ranging governance 
contributions aimed at long-term goals such as economic diversification and transparent revenue 
management. The costs associated with this engagement appear out of proportion in relation to BP’s 
interest in securing its operations near Nagorno Karabakh.  
A major push factor for BP’s governance contributions towards peace and security was transnational civil 
society activism. The development of the BTC pipeline was accompanied by an international campaign 
involving both Azerbaijani and international NGOs. The Baku-Ceyhan Campaign, including international 
NGOs such as Platform or Friends of the Earth, raised strong political, social and environmental 
concerns about the BTC project (e.g. Muttitt/Marriott 2002). In addition to direct protests, NGOs voiced 
their criticism in letters to the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) and other funding institutions (Baku-Ceyhan Campaign n.d.). Among the different subjects 
covered through public criticism, NGOs highlight that the BTC and SCP projects could aggravate the 
human rights situation and fuel corruption (Amnesty International 2003; Green Alternative et al. 2002). 
BP has not avoided the criticism brought forward by civil society actors, but “has sought to enter into 
dialogue with critics of the BTC project, to seek effective new approaches to rule out potential problems, 
and to institute an unprecedented level of transparency in connection with the project” (Elkind 2005: 54). 
The former president of BP Azerbaijan acknowledges that, despite ongoing criticism of the project, 
“we’ve found a large group of the NGOs want to engage with us on this” (cited in Andrews 2004: 22). BP 
has regularly consulted with local and international NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch in its risk assessments and efforts to implement human rights standards within the BTC and 
SCP projects (Smith 2006; 2008). Furthermore, BP has cooperated with the Open Society Foundations to 
provide training for local NGOs involved in monitoring activities of BP projects. Azerbaijani NGOs have 
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worked with BP both in the framework of the EITI and BTC and SCP projects. Transnational NGOs 
have rendered significant support for activism of the rather weak local civil society in Azerbaijan 
(Molchanov 2011). While much of transnational civil society activism was directed at BP’s pipeline 
projects, international NGOs also raised public attention to BP’s role as a “pillar of the Aliyev regime” 
(Friends of the Earth et al. 2005). BP’s support of a corrupt and authoritarian regime represents the main 
line of criticism. On the other hand, international NGO activism has demonstrated cooperative policies 
towards BP’s role in Azerbaijan through consultation in the framework the global EITI and within 
cooperation with Transparency International on anti-corruption and transparency policies and 
cooperation with International Alert on local business development (BTC Co. et al. 2003). 
In Azerbaijan, confrontational strategies of the transnational civil society have exercised significant 
pressure on BP to pursue a conflict-sensitive and transparent approach towards the pipeline projects. In a 
joint statement, the BTC parties state: “We note concerns expressed by various non-governmental 
organizations about the BTC Project. We take these concerns seriously”. Specifically, the parties note: 
“We are determined to make the BTC Project a model project in all respects, and the environmental, 
social, and human rights aspects of the project are of fundamental importance” (Republic of Azerbaijan et 
al. 2003: n.p.). The mechanisms behind BP’s response, on the one hand, are real and potential reputational 
costs associated with civil society activism and resulting media attention (e.g. Macalister 2003). 
Furthermore, BP faced economic risks because the (potential) project lenders, such as the World Bank, 
were targeted by civil society activism. Following heavy criticism of the World Bank’s involvement in the 
Chad-Cameroon pipeline project, the bank was particularly sensitive to NGO activism and sought to 
avoid past mistakes (Mansley 2003: 20-22). Together with the EBRD, the bank played an important role in 
the establishment of environmental and social impact assessments, consultations, and monitoring activities 
(International Alert 2004: 12; Smith G.A. 2004: 78). In addition to the different oil and gas projects, BP 
was faced with (potential) reputational costs through transnational NGOs activism around its cooperation 
with the government. BP’s anti-corruption and economic diversification governance schemes represent a 
step in countering this criticism and, thus, constitute a direct response to transnational civil society 
activism. On the other hand, collaborative strategies of transnational civil society actors have induced BP 
to engage towards peace and security through increased legitimacy and risk mitigation (e.g. Carroll 2010). 
This mechanism relates closely to BP’s overall image as a pioneer in CSR, developed over the course of 
time and the related reputation-sensitivity. In line with the launch of the new BP slogan “Beyond 
Petroleum” in 2000, the company initiated a strategic move towards environmental and later also 
increasingly social responsibility policies. BP’s reputation greatly profited from this strategic reorientation. 
In 2001, for instance, BP ranked first in two categories of the Financial Times’ and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ survey of the world’s most respected companies (Financial 
Times/PricewaterhousCooper 2001). As BP’s reputation comprises a great part of the company’s business 
value, BP is highly dependent on public perceptions. The environmental disaster of the Deepwater 
Horizen oil spill in the Mexican Gulf, for example, strongly damaged BP’s reputation as a responsible 
company and created enormous financial losses. In this regard, BP’s company and production 
characteristics as a highly visible company with a brand name and close connections to consumers plays 
an important role. 
Earlier experiences of BP in conflict zones and in interactions with civil society organizations were 
influential in shaping BP’s overall CSR strategy and engagement in Azerbaijan. In Columbia, BP faced 
NGO criticism and media attention over its complicity in human rights abuses. The company made direct 
payments to the military, which was accused of gross human rights violations. BP also provided the state 
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with information about protesters, which allegedly led to violent repression and disappearances (Frynas 
2009: 23). With this experience and the recognition of rising importance of international stakeholder 
pressure, BP embarked on new social and environmental policies, including human rights policies (Frynas 
2009: 23). The former BP manager David Rice notes:  
“[W]e’ve learned from our mistakes, not least because we’ve been challenged by NGOs. In Columbia 
we were accused of getting too close to the army and police in order to protect our operations. We 
listened, approached Human Rights Watch for advice, and organized new security arrangements.” 
(Rice 2002: 135) 
Furthermore, BP’s experience in Angola led to a rethinking of transparency policies. The company was 
put under public scrutiny by international NGOs for operating under a non-transparent government 
where oil revenues were used to fund war efforts (Global Witness 1999; Human Rights Watch 2001). In 
response to increasing NGO demands for transparency, BP, as the first company in Angola, agreed to 
voluntarily disclose payments.33 In the same year, BP disclosed payments made to the government of 
Azerbaijan. With this commitment, “BP undeniably set a new standard of fiscal transparency” (Skjærseth 
et al. 2004: 10). Both experiences, in Colombia and Angola, led to an overall move towards increased 
stakeholder consultation and a recognition of the company’s social responsibility. The resulting CSR 
policies, in Columbia and Angola, as well as at the global level, and the experience gained in repeated 
interaction with transnational civil society actors have certainly contributed to BP’s do-no-harm and risk 
minimization strategy, regarding both immediate conflict and financial and reputational risks, in 
Azerbaijan. 
The host state environment in Azerbaijan is another explanatory factor for BP’s engagement towards 
peace and security. Following instability and chaos after independence and during the intense phase of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh war between 1992 and 1994, Azerbaijan has gradually developed its shadow of 
hierarchy. President Heydar Aliyev, who gained power in a military coup in 1993, established an 
authoritarian system “with strong dynastic elements”, characterized by paternalistic control (Franke et al. 
2009: 117-118). After the death of Heydar Aliyev, his son, Ilham Aliyev, became president and further 
consolidated autocratic structures. In Azerbaijan, the consolidation of the state went hand in hand with 
the concentration of power in the presidency (Kamrava 2001). Within this system, Azerbaijan 
demonstrates a medium-to-high level statehood. Central state authorities “have firm control over the 
country’s territory, with the exception of the territories occupied by Armenia” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 
2012a: 5). Moreover, Azerbaijan has progressively developed comprehensive administrative structures. 
The quality of services provided, however, varies significantly and exhibits deficiencies such as corruption 
and incompetence (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2008: 6; 2012a: 6).34 Azerbaijan is therefore capable to cast a 
credible shadow of hierarchy. In 2012, it publicly threatened to take “serious measures” against BP over 
the company’s failure in meeting oil output targets, which created revenue losses of some US$ 8 billion 
(Gosden 2012). A leaked US diplomatic cable further revealed that Azerbaijan had threatened to sue the 
company over oil profits in the past (The Guardian 2010). While demonstrating the ability to credibly 
threaten BP to engage in governance towards peace and security, there is no evidence that the government 
has done so. Rather, the medium “shadow of hierarchy” was instrumental in providing favorable 
conditions for an effective partnership with BP, both in the framework of operations and governance 
                                                 
33 In response to BP’s commitment, however, the government of Angola threatened to revoke the company’s 
operating license.   
34 In the past BTI ratings, Azerbaijan’s monopoly on the use of force and basic administration scores rose from 6 in 
2006 to 7 in 2012, with 1 being the lowest and 10 the highest score (BTI 2012c). 
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contributions. Exhibiting a medium-to-high capacity to implement governance unilaterally, the 
government carries sufficient capacities for a reliable partner in governance schemes on transparency and 
economic diversification.  
Azerbaijan’s overall willingness to provide peace and security is, however, limited. The government has 
demonstrated an increasing reluctance to advance a negotiated settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. On the contrary, it has fuelled an arms race with Armenia and threatened to withdraw from 
negotiations (International Crisis Group 2011). While outright war could potentially damage oil and gas 
infrastructure and Azerbaijan’s international reputation (Davis 2013: 65), Aliyev instrumentalizes the risk 
of war to distract attention from domestic problems and to maintain political control (International Crisis 
Group 2011: 11; Kaldor 2007: 179). Eventually, this strategy could spiral out of control and lead to the 
reemergence of war (Davis 2013: 65). In addition, Azerbaijan is fuelling domestic tensions through 
repressive policies towards oppositional forces. Despite the overall reluctant and uncompromising 
position of the government towards solving domestic and regional conflict, the country has initiated 
several conflict-relevant policies and activities. Azerbaijan’s anti-corruption policies are a notable example 
of conflict-relevant governance contributions. Initiatives include the State Program on Combating 
Corruption, the National Strategy on Increasing Transparency and Combating Corruption and 
Azerbaijan’s participation in the EITI. Furthermore, the government launched a high-profile anti-
corruption campaign in January 2011. Apart from increased revenue transparency, corruption levels 
remain high so far (Freedom House 2012). Börzel and Pamuk note that corruption policies and activities 
do not genuinely foster public participation or civil oversight. In contrast, “the efforts of Azerbaijan’s 
authorities to fight corruption have focused on strengthening the state apparatus, expanding its control 
over society and fostering the power of the incumbents” (Börzel/Pamuk 2011: 15).  
In addition to anti-corruption policies, Azerbaijan pursued private sector development and economic 
diversification. As oil volumes are projected to shrink in the near future (International Crisis Group 2011: 
11), the country has an interest in reducing its overreliance on oil and gas revenues. SOFAS, for example, 
uses a part of the oil and gas revenues to finance development in non-energy sectors. In 2010, Azerbaijan 
further invested 75 percent of the US$ 17 billion going to development projects in Azerbaijan in non-
energy-related sectors (Abbasov 2011). Priority sectors are agriculture, information and communication 
technology, transport and tourism. The vision of a more diversified economy was first formulated in the 
State Program for Poverty Reduction and Economic Development 2003-2005, but despite several 
activities, economic diversification remains a challenge for the rentier state Azerbaijan (World Bank 2009).  
Although not necessarily efficient or genuinely directed at peace and security, these conflict-relevant 
policies and activities of the government of Azerbaijan have offered points of departure for BP’s anti-
corruption and economic diversification engagement. BP’s macro-policies are directed at the state and, 
therefore, cannot be exercised against the government. The willingness of the Azerbaijani government 
effectively enabled BP’s engagement, but did not induce it through a threat or appeal mechanism. There is 
no evidence that the government threatened regulation directed at peace and security if BP would not 
engage. Moreover, the government, criticized by local and international stakeholders for various policies, 
did not offer sufficient legitimacy or financial and material benefits to induce BP to engage through an 
appeal mechanism. In fact, the government’s overall reluctance in fostering peace and security could be an 
obstacle for corporate policies, for instance, directed at participatory regional approaches including 
Armenia. As far as policies towards peace and security diverged, BP acted carefully and avoided tensions 
with the government to prevent business risks as experienced in Angola. “[T]he company is careful to 
avoid upsetting the host government and undermining its business interests” (Gulbrandsen/Moe 2007: 7). 
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The selective conflict-relevant policies of the government, on the other hand, enabled concerted efforts of 
BP and Azerbaijan. Concerning BP’s conflict-sensitive policies in the framework of the pipeline projects, 
the government has taken on a rather neutral position. The transparency policy was in line with the 
governmental strategies and human rights and security precautions did not create significant costs for the 
government to object. Moreover, BP enjoyed a higher bargaining power before the oil boom (Frynas 
2009: 148), which could explain its increased ability to influence the projects. With increasing oil revenues 
and the related confidence boost of the government, however, BP’s leverage shrank (Gulbrandsen/Moe 
2007: 7) and the company became more dependent on the government’s approval. Against this 
background, the state’s willingness to selectively provide conflict-relevant governance represented a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for BP’s engagement in a state with a medium-level capacity to 
implement governance unilaterally. A medium-level capacity to implement governance was further 
necessary for BP’s partnership with the state. 
4. COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The cases above were analyzed to identify the conditions under which TNCs contribute to peace and 
security. In both cases, company engagement related mainly indirectly to peace and security. Shell and BP 
both contributed to peace and security through conflict-relevant policies and activities on the political 
order and socioeconomic dimension. Transparency policies, targeting in particular the oil and gas industry, 
as well as private sector development, played an important role in both cases. None of the companies, 
however, exhibited engagement on the sociocultural dimension. In Azerbaijan, BP further applied 
conflict-sensitive policies and activities that were largely geared towards “doing no harm”. Shell in Nigeria, 
on the other hand, incorporated procedural conflict-sensitive approaches in its conflict-relevant 
governance schemes. The only engagement directly connected to peace and security, was Shell’s human 
rights and security policy in the Niger Delta. The different focuses of the companies’ engagement relate 
closely to the conflict setting. In Nigeria, Shell was faced with outright violence as a target, which 
conceivably led to more direct interventions in the conflict that aim for conflict mitigation and tackle root 
causes. BP, on the other hand, operated in a less violent but highly tense conflict environment. This 
explains BP’s strong focus on the prevention of escalating conflict through conflict-sensitive approaches 
and intervention in conflict-aggravating fields. The interstate dimension of the conflict in Azerbaijan, 
which is expressed in confrontations between state military forces, further raised the bar for direct 
interventions of BP.  
But why do TNCs contribute to peace and security, directly or indirectly, at all? The evidence suggests that 
conflict proximity only bears limited relevance for TNC engagement in peace and security. On the one 
hand, conflict proximity proved to be a crucial factor in determining the companies’ interests in security 
and the minimization of conflict-associated risks. While Shell experienced direct costs from violence, BP 
was well aware of the potential risks emerging from conflict proximity. The vulnerability of the companies 
towards the geographically proximate conflict in both cases can be attributed to production characteristics, 
such as pipelines. On the other hand, this vulnerability and interest in security was not a sufficient 
condition for the companies’ engagement towards peace and security. Shell already suffered economic 
costs from the proximate conflict during its “business as usual” phase. And while the geographic 
proximity to the Nagorno-Karabakh certainly influenced conflict-sensitive practices around BP’s pipelines 
near the region, it cannot sufficiently explain the full scope of BP’s engagement. The hypothesis (H3) 
could, therefore, not be substantiated in this research.  
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Another factor for the companies’ engagement towards peace and security was the host state 
environment. However, in the two cases, neither the threat nor the appeal mechanism held much 
explanatory power. Although Azerbaijan and Nigeria both had a medium-level capacity to implement 
governance unilaterally and were at least partially willing to provide peace and security (or related policies), 
the governments did not use threatening capacities to induce corporations to engage in governance.35 In 
addition, there was only limited evidence for the appeal mechanism. While Shell profited from a 
partnership with the government, the benefits were not profound enough to “trigger” engagement in the 
first place. Moreover, Shell had already initiated a policy shift before the state’s transition. In Azerbaijan 
there was no evidence of a direct appeal mechanism, which could be ascribed to the government’s limited 
willingness. Collaborative governance schemes between companies and governments rather stemmed 
from the structure of the oil and gas production arrangements or overall business interests in the country. 
Nonetheless, government capacity and willingness proved to be important factors. For cooperative 
governance schemes, for instance, a medium capacity of the government to implement governance is 
necessary. Moreover, the research demonstrates that a minimum degree of host state willingness was 
necessary for the companies to engage towards peace and security. Whether genuinely directed at peace or 
not, the state’s willingness to implement conflict-relevant and conflict-sensitive policies enabled Shell and 
BP to engage in this field. In contrast, the lack of willingness provides an obstacle to corporate 
engagement. When corporations contribute to governance against the interests of the government, as BP 
attempted in Angola, it could potentially hurt their business interests. Rather than a sufficient condition, 
government capacity to implement governance coupled with willingness to provide peace and security 
proved to be a necessary condition for corporate engagement in the framework of cooperative governance 
schemes with the state. In states with at least medium-level capacities, willingness is also an important 
factor for unilateral corporate governance contributions. The hypothesis was, therefore, not substantiated 
(H2).  
The essential driver of corporate engagement towards peace and security in both cases was transnational 
civil society activism. The empirical findings suggest that strategic calculations of financial and reputational 
costs and gains, as well as possible efficiency gains, are the dominant causal mechanisms linking activism 
to engagement. In the case of Shell, transnational NGOs, engaged around peace and security issues in a 
wider sense, first pressured the company into a policy shift towards CSR in Nigeria and at the global level. 
The ability of local civil society actors, notably the MOSOP movement, in gaining support from 
international civil society played an important role in this regard. Transnational activist networks incurred 
largely reputational costs for Shell through naming and shaming campaigns, which led to a rethinking of 
its position towards its stakeholders, also in the Niger Delta. After this shift, transnational civil society 
activism continuously influenced Shell’s behavior through confrontational strategies that involved real or 
potential financial and reputational costs. Increasingly, civil society actors have also relied on collaborative 
policies, which have induced Shell to engage through reputation and possible efficiency gains. Similarly, 
BP’s engagement towards peace and security in Azerbaijan resulted largely from transnational civil society 
activism. Previous confrontational strategies of transnational NGOs on BP’s behavior in Columbia and 
Angola first initiated an overall rethinking of related CSR policies. In addition to this policy stance at the 
global level, both confrontational and collaborative strategies of international civil society activists induced 
BP to adopt conflict-sensitive approaches towards the pipeline construction and maintenance and 
conflict-relevant engagement to counter corruption and overreliance on energy revenues. Similar to Shell, 
                                                 
35 While there was no evidence for such mechanisms, they cannot be entirely excluded. It appears plausible that such 
threats are often made behind closed doors and not made public.   
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transnational activism induced BP to engage through (potential) financial and reputational costs, expertise 
and legitimacy gains. Consequently, the empirical evidence is congruent with the hypothesis developed 
earlier (H1).  
Overall, the hypotheses could not fully explain corporate governance contributions towards peace and 
security. Both company and production characteristics played an important role in interaction with other 
factors. On the one hand, the companies’ production-specific characteristics, in particular the reliance on 
oil and gas pipelines and the location of oil exploration activities, determined the companies’ vulnerability 
towards conflict. On the other hand, the companies’ high reputation-sensitivity, determined by both 
company strategy and company and production characteristics, renders them vulnerable to 
confrontational transnational civil society activism. Through the companies’ downstream activities, Shell 
and BP are close to customers. The size of the company, the origin in Western industrial countries and the 
brand name further enhance their visibility and vulnerability to naming and shaming activism. At the same 
time, both Shell’s and BP’s CSR engagement is part of their business concept. The shift towards CSR 
policies can also be attributed to the companies’ strategic business decision to set themselves apart from 
competitors through the reputation of a socially responsible corporation (“the business case”). The 
increasing collaborative strategies of transnational civil society actors build on this strategy by inducing 
corporations to engage through reputational gains. Without those gains, BP and Shell would have been 
unlikely to engage with civil society in a wider scope. Thus, reputation-sensitivity proved to be a necessary 
condition for the influence of civil society activism.  
Furthermore, the empirical evidence showed that experiences in conflict settings and, most importantly, 
repeated interaction with transnational civil society actors have led to instrumental learning (Panke 2004) 
on the part of the companies. The experiences have resulted in a better understanding of risks associated 
with conflicts and activism and a gradual adjustment of corporate policies to external constraints and 
potential opportunities. Finally, it has to be noted that in addition to civil society actors and host states, 
other stakeholders can influence the companies’ cost-benefit calculations. In their governance schemes, 
for example, Shell and BP both cooperated with other states, international organizations or financial 
institutions. For example, the World Bank’s involvement in BP’s BTC and SCP projects as a lending 
institution contributed to the conflict-sensitive approach taken in the construction and maintenance of the 
pipelines. Moreover, as the home state of BP, the UK promoted the multistakeholder initiative EITI and 
encouraged BP’s participation in it. 
 Taken together, it becomes evident that, under the rationalist analytical lens, the companies’ engagement 
in conflict zones is determined by external constraints. Cost-benefit calculations in a complex market 
environment that increasingly expects companies to take on social responsibility were the driver of BP’s 
and Shell’s decisions. The cases have demonstrated that strategic calculation can occur with a long-term 
perspective and involve instrumental learning. Constructivist perspectives, in contrast, would interpret the 
causal pathways not as strategic calculation but argumentative persuasion and focus on the changing 
preference of Shell and BP. Ultimately, there is no way to exclude the applicability of such mechanisms in 
this research. But it appears plausible that companies’ references to social norms can be interpreted as a 
strategic tool to improve the company’s image or legitimize corporate practices. Moreover, instances of 
non-compliance, as for example Shell’s environmental non-compliance in the Niger Delta in view of 
limited governmental monitoring and enforcement capacities, indicate that companies will deviate from 
social norms when external constraints lack. Finally, the existence of a global CSR norm can be excluded 
as an explanation of the companies’ engagement, because company engagement varies even among big 
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Western oil companies. Rather, the emergence of the global CSR norm has changed the environment in 
which companies operate.  
5. CONCLUSION 
The empirical results show that TNCs have taken on different roles in zones of conflict outside their 
involvement in causing or aggravating conflict. Rather than only fuelling violence, this case study has 
observed various TNC contributions to peace and security. Most governance contributions addressed 
violent conflicts indirectly through conflict-relevant engagement in other policy fields. Other contributions 
include conflict-sensitive governance schemes. Direct contributions to peace and security, however, 
remain an exception. The empirical analysis, directed at the investigation of the conditions of such 
engagement, found transnational civil society activism the major driver of corporate governance 
contributions. As a necessary condition for this influence, the study identified reputation-sensitivity of 
TNCs, which is strongly determined by company and production characteristics and possibly corporate 
business strategy. Conflict proximity proved to be another important factor, although not as a sufficient 
condition. Rather, the experience of real or the awareness of potential material, financial and reputational 
costs through geographic proximity increased the company’s interest in security and peace. While a 
medium-host state capacity to implement governance unilaterally combined with the government’s 
willingness to provide peace and security did not cause corporate governance contributions to peace and 
security, it still played a significant role. In both cases, a medium-capacity combined with at least a 
selective willingness proved to be a necessary condition for cooperative governance schemes of TNCs. It 
further became evident that unilateral TNC governance cannot work when directed against the 
government’s will. These results do not contradict a potential engagement-triggering role of host 
governments per se. However, the findings show that the host state has a role to play beyond threatening 
or inducing corporate engagement. While much research regarding the “shadow of hierarchy” has focused 
primarily on coercive capacities of the state, this analysis has also highlighted the importance of the host 
state willingness.  
In sum, H1 was confirmed whereas H2 and H3 could not be substantiated. Since there is likely to be more 
than one sufficient condition for corporate engagement in governance, H2 is not rejected for future 
research. H3, on the other hand, appeared to be a precondition rather than a trigger for corporate 
engagement. Further research should explore this finding and look at other potential conflict influences. 
Departing from the additional influences found in the case study, this thesis also acknowledges the need 
for further research on the role of the “business case” and other external stakeholders, such as the home 
state and international organizations, for corporate engagement in peace and security. In addition to 
exploring the role of other factors in more detail, further cases studies could test the empirical findings, 
particularly the interplay between necessary and sufficient conditions, as well as structural and dynamic 
influences. In this context, future research could also investigate whether and how rationalist and 
constructivist causal paths link. To substantiate the findings, case studies should include different values 
on the dependent variable.  
Understanding the conditions of corporate governance contributions to peace and security represents an 
important step in evaluating TNC roles in conflict and finding solutions to conflict settings more generally 
and TNC involvement in conflict zones in particular. Although this research focused on TNCs from the 
extractive sector, the arguments put forward also bear relevance for TNCs in other sectors with similar 
reputation-sensitivity or vulnerability towards violent conflict. When TNCs with these characteristics 
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cause or aggravate violent conflict, transnational civil society organizations can pressure or induce them to 
reevaluate their policies towards positive contributions. Continuous interaction, possibly in the framework 
of cooperative governance schemes, can make compliance with proclaimed policies more likely. Similarly, 
host governments can cooperate with TNCs or threaten them to foster peace, when willing and able to do 
so. In extractive industries, governments usually have considerable leverage over companies once the 
production is running. A serious challenge in this vein, however, remains in addressing authoritarian and 
rentier state structures that undermine the host country’s willingness to provide public goods for its own 
population and an enabling environment for TNC social responsibility. These implications also relate to 
the wider discussion on global governance, especially in areas of limited statehood. Aside from the 
generally accepted role of transnational civil society, the results in this study underline that a minimum 
degree of statehood is necessary for governance with government. Furthermore, the research has shown 
that a minimum of agreement on governance issues is necessary for governance both with and without 
government.  
Finally, it has to be noted that although the policy options put forward here have the potential to induce 
TNC governance contributions, their effectiveness is not guaranteed. At first sight, the impact of 
corporate engagement towards peace and security remained limited. Indeed, TNC governance 
contributions can have unintended negative effects on the conflict. Another issue that remained 
unaddressed in this research is the legitimacy of corporate interventions. Both output and input legitimacy 
dimensions should be considered in future research. While research on the effectiveness of interventions 
offers points of departure for possible output legitimacy, the investigation of potential governance 
structures that include, for example, participatory structures directed at increasing corporate 
accountability, may provide insights on increased input legitimacy. Essentially, these considerations are 
crucial in assessing, not only under which conditions TNCs contribute to governance in zones of conflict, 





Abbasov, Shahin 2011: Azerbaijan: Baku Hedging Its Economic Bets, in: Eurasianet, 15 August 
2011, in: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64042 (6 March 2013). 
Aliyev, Ilham 2010: Speech at the commissioning of a residential building for Karabakh war 
veterans and martyrs’ families, in: http://en.president.az/articles/1318 (6 March 2013). 
Amnesty International 2013: Staying Power. Keeping Up the Fight for Human Rights, in 2012 
and Beyond, Wire, 43(1).  
Amnesty International 2003: Human Rights on the Line. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline 
Project, London: Amnesty International. 
Andrews, Lisa 2004: Azerbaijan. On Track for Success, in: BP Magazine, 2004(2), 
http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/downloads
/B/BPM_O4two.pdf (6 March 2013), 17-23. 
Asgill, Stephanie 2012: The Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI): Tool 
for Conflict Resolution in the Niger Delta or Arena of Contested Politics?, in: Critical 
African Studies, 4(7), 4-57. 
ASRC (Azerbaijan Social Review Commission) 2011: The Azerbaijan Social Review Commission 
Fifth Report. August 2011, in: 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/bp_caspian/bp_caspian_en/STAGING/loc
al_assets/downloads_pdfs/a/ASRC_Fifth_Report_2011.pdf (6 March 2013). 
Asuni, Judith Burdin 2009: Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta, CFR Working 
Papers, September 2009, New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations.  
Auty, Richard 2001: Resource Abundance and Economic Development, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Baku-Ceyhan Campaign n.d.: Correspondence, in: http://www.baku.org.uk/correspondence.htm 
(6 March 2013). 
Ballentine, Karen/Haufler, Virginia 2005: Enabling Economies of Peace. Public Policy for 
Conflict-Sensitive Business, New York, NY: United Nations Global Compact. 
Ballentine, Karen/Nitzschke, Heiko 2005a: Introduction, in: Ballentine, Karen/Nitzschke, Heiko 
(eds): Profiting from Peace: Managing the Resource Dimension of Civil War, Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner, 1-24. 
Ballentine, Karen/Nitzschke, Heiko (eds) 2005b: Profiting from Peace: Managing the Resource 
Dimension of Civil War, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Ballentine, Karen/Nitzschke, Heiko 2004: Business and Armed Conflict: An Assessment of 
Issues and Options, in: Die Friedenswarte, 79(1/2), 35-56. 
Ballentine, Karen/Sherman, Jake (eds) 2003: The Political Economy of Armed Conflict. Beyond 
Greed and Grievance, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.  
Banfield, Jessica/Haufler, Virginia/Lilly, Damian 2003: Transnational Corporations in Conflict 
Prone Zones: Public Policy Responses and a Framework for Action, London: 
International Alert. 
Basedau, Matthias 2005: Context Matters. Rethinking the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Working Papers Global and Area Studies, No. 1, Hamburg: Institut fu  r Afrikakunde. 
Baskin, Jeremy 2006: Corporate Responsibility in Emerging Markets, in: Journal of Corporate 
Citizenship, 24(Winter), 29-47. 
Beder, Sharon 2002: bp: Beyond Petroleum?, in: Lubbers, Eveline (ed.): Battling Big Business. 
Countering Greenwash, Infiltration, and Other Forms of Corporate Bullying, Devon: 
Green Books, 26-32. 
Bendell, Jem 2004: Barricades and Boardrooms. A Contemporary History of the Corporate 
Accountability Movement, Technology, Business and Society Programme Papers, No. 13, 
Geneva: UNRISD. 
Berdal, Mats/Keen, David 1997: Violence and Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Some Policy 




Berman, Jonathan 2000: Boardrooms and Bombs. Strategies of Multinational Corporations in 
Conflict Areas, in: Harvard International Review, 22(3), 28-32. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a: BTI 2012 – Azerbaijan Country Report, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann 
Stiftung. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012b: BTI 2012 – Nigeria Country Report, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann 
Stiftung.  
Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012c: BTI Ergebnisse 2003 – 2012, in: http://www.bti-
project.de/publikationen/downloads/ (6 March 2013).  
Bertelsmann Stiftung 2008: BTI 2008 – Azerbaijan Country Report, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann 
Stiftung. 
Bob, Clifford 2002: Political Process Theory and Transnational Movements: Dialectics of Protest 
among Nigeria’s Ogoni Minority, in: Social Problems, 49(3), 395-415. 
Boonstra, Jos/Burke, Edward/Youngs, Richard 2008: The Politics of Energy: Comparing 
Azerbaijan, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia, FRIDE Working Papers, No. 68, Madrid: FRIDE. 
Börzel, Tanja A. 2012: How Much Statehood Does It Take – And What For?, SFB-Governance 
Working Paper Series, No. 29, Berlin: DFG Research Center (SFB) 700, Freie Universität 
Berlin. 
Börzel, Tanja A. 2010: Governance with/out Government. False Promises or Flawed Premises?, 
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 23, Berlin: DFG Research Center (SFB) 700, 
Freie Universität Berlin.  
Börzel, Tanja A./Pamuk, Yasemin 2011: Europeanization Subverted? The European Union’s 
Promotion of Good Governance and the Fight against Corruption in the Southern 
Caucasus, KFG Working Paper Series, No. 26, Berlin: Kolleg-Forschergruppe “The 
Transformative Power of Europe, Freie Universität Berlin. 
Börzel, Tanja A./Risse, Thomas 2010: Governance without a State: Can It Work?, in: Regulation 
& Governance, 4(2), 113-134. 
Börzel, Tanja A./Héritier, Adrienne/Kranz, Nicole/Thauer, Christian 2011: Racing to the Top? 
Business and Governance in South Africa, in: Risse, Thomas (ed.): Governance Without a 
State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood, New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 144-170. 
BP 2012a: Annual Report and Form 20-F 2011. Building a Stronger, Safer BP, in: 
http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/set_branch/ST
AGING/common_assets/bpin2011/downloads/BP_Annual_Report_and_Form_20F_2
011.pdf (6 March 2013). 
BP 2012b: BP-Annual Report on the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. 
January to December 2011, in: 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/e_s_ass
ets/e_s_assets_2010/downloads_pdfs/Voluntary_Principles_plenary_2012.pdf (6 March 
2013). 




BP 2008: Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights Implementation Guideline. An 
Extended Summary, in: 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/e_s_ass
ets/e_s_assets_2010/downloads_pdfs/Implementation_Guidance_Tools.pdf (6 March 
2013). 
BP 2006: Human Rights. A Guidance Note, in: 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/downlo




BP 2005: Caspian Development Advisory Panel. BP Response to the Letter from the Panel to the 
Lord Browne of Madingley, December 2005, in: 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/bp_caspian/bp_caspian_en/STAGING/loc
al_assets/downloads_pdfs/c/CDAP_BP_Response_to_28_December_2005_letter.pdf 
(6 March 2013). 
Bray, John 2009: The Role of Private Sector Actors in Post-Conflict Recovery, in: Conflict, 
Security & Development, 9(1), 1-26. 
BTC Co./AIOC/Shah Deniz/BP 2003: Regional Review, in: 
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=9030155&contentId=7021108 (6 
March 2013). 
Carroll, Archie B. 1979: A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance, in: 
The Academy of Management Review, 4(4), 497-505.  
Carroll, Toby 2010: New Approaches to Opening Markets: The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline 
and the Deployment of Social and Environmental Risk Mitigation, Political Studies 
Association Conference Proceedings, in: 
http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/1157_1007.pdf (6 March 2013).  
Central Bank of Nigeria 2011: Annual Report 2011, in: 
http://www.cenbank.org/AR2011/DEFAULT.ASP (6 March 2013).  
Chiquita 2008: Code of Conduct. Working to Produce Trust, in: 
http://www.chiquita.com/Code-of-Conduct-PDF/ChiquitaCode-FINAL-EN.aspx (6 
March 2013).  
Collier, Paul 2000: Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective, in: Berdal, Mats/Malone, 
David M. (eds): Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 91-111. 
Collier, Paul/Hoeffler, Anke 2004: Greed and Grievance in Civil War, in: Oxford Economic 
Papers, 56(4), 563-595. 
Collier, Paul/Hoeffler, Anke/Söderbom, Måns 2004: On the Duration of Civil War, in: Journal 
of Peace Research, 41(3), 253-273.  
Corden, W. Max/Neary, J. Peter 1982: Booming Sector and De-Industrialisation in a Small Open 
Economy, in: The Economic Journal, 92(368), 825-848.  
Cornell, Svante E. 2002: The South Caucasus. A Regional Overview and Conflict Assessment, 
Stockholm: SIDA/Cornell Caspian Consulting.  
Crude Accountability 2012: After the BTC Pipeline and EITI Validation: Where Are Prosperity 
and Transparency in Azerbaijan?, Alexandria, VA: Crude Accountability. 
CSR Network 2003: Environmental, Land, Community and Social Overview. Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan Pipeline Project, in: 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/bp_caspian/bp_caspian_en/STAGING/loc
al_assets/downloads_pdfs/xyz/BTC_English_Environmental_and_Social_Overview_Co
ntent_BTC_Environment-the_Project.pdf (6 March 2013). 
Curbach, Janina 2009: Die Corporate-Social-Responsibility-Bewegung, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 
Cutler, Claire A./Haufler, Virginia/Porter, Tony 1999: Private Authority and International 
Affairs, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Davis, Peter 2013: Corporations, Global Governance and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 
Abingdon: Routledge.  
Deitelhoff, Nicole 2010: Private Security and Military Companies: The Other Side of Business 
and Conflict, in: Deitelhoff, Nicole/Wolf, Klaus Dieter (eds.): Corporate Security 
Responsibility? Corporate Governance Contributions to Peace and Security in Zones of 
Conflict, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 177-201. 
 
Deitelhoff, Nicole/Wolf, Klaus Dieter 2010a: Corporate Security Responsibility: Corporate 
Governance Contributions to Peace and Security in Zones of Conflict, in: Deitelhoff, 
48 
 
Nicole/Wolf, Klaus Dieter (eds.): Corporate Security Responsibility? Corporate 
Governance Contributions to Peace and Security in Zones of Conflict, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1-25. 
Deitelhoff, Nicole/Wolf, Klaus Dieter (eds) 2010b: Corporate Security Responsibility? Corporate 
Governance Contributions to Peace and Security in Zones of Conflict, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Deitelhoff, Nicole/Feil, Moira/Fischer, Susanne/Haidvogel, Andreas/Wolf, Klaus 
Dieter/Zimmer, Melanie 2010: Business in Zones of Conflict and Global Security 
Governance: What Has Been Learnt and Where to from Here?, in: Deitelhoff, 
Nicole/Wolf, Klaus Dieter (eds): Corporate Security Responsibility? Corporate 
Governance Contributions to Peace and Security in Zones of Conflict, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 202-226. 
Detheridge, Alan/Pepple, Noble (Shell) 1998: A Response to Frynas, in: Third World Quarterly, 
19(3), 479-486.  
De Soysa, Indra 2000: The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity?, in: 
Berdal, Mats/Malone, David (eds): Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil 
War, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 113-135. 
De Waal, Thomas 2005: The Nagorny Karabakh Conflict. Origins, Dynamics, and 
Misperceptions, in: Broers, Laurence (ed.): The Limits of Leadership. Elites and Societies 
in the Nagorny Karabakh Peace Process, London: Conciliation Resources, 12-17. 
Dion, Douglas 1998: Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study, in: Comparative 
Politics, 30(2), 127-145. 
Donaldson, Thomas/Preston, Lee E. 1995: The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: 
Concepts, Evidence and Implications, in: The Academy of Management Review, 20(1), 
65-91. 
Drauth, Carlo Manuel 2010: Closing Global Governance Gaps Through Corporate Social 
Responsibility? Conditions for the Effectiveness of the OECD Guidelines, the ILO 
Declaration and the UN Global Compact in Ensuring Responsible Business Conduct, 
Hertie School of Governance Working Papers, No. 54, Berlin: Hertie School of 
Governance. 
Duffield, Mark 2000: Globalization, Transborder Trade, and War Economies, in: Berdal, 
Mats/Malone, David M. (eds): Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 69-89. 
ECCR (Ecumenical Council for Corporate Responsibility) 2010: Shell in the Niger Delta: A 
Framework for Change. Five Case Studies from Civil Society, Oxford: ECCR. 
EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit) 2013: Country Report. Azerbaijan, in: 
http://country.eiu.com/FileHandler.ashx?issue_id=1110031295&mode=pdf (6 March 
2013). 
Elkind, Jonathan 2005: Economic Implications of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, in: Starr, 
Frederick S./Cornell, Svante E. (eds): The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to 
the West, Washington, DC: Central-Asia Caucasus Institute, 39-60. 
Engel, Ulf 2005: The Niger Delta Region – A Strategic Conflict Analysis of Conflicts Around 
Oil, in: Basedau, Matthias/Mehler, Andreas (eds): Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Hamburg: Institut für Afrikakunde, 191-221.  
European Commission 2002: Communication from the Commission Concerning Corporate 
Social Responsibility: A Business Contribution to Sustainable Development, COM(2002) 
347 final, Brussels: European Commission.  
European Commission 2001: Green Paper. Promoting a European Framework for Corporate 
Social Responsibility, COM(2001) 366 final, Brussels: European Commission.  
Fearon, James/Wendt, Alexander 2002: Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View, in: 
Carlsnaes, Walter/Risse, Thomas/Simmons, Beth A. (eds): Handbook of International 




Feil, Moira 2012: Global Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility in Conflict Zones, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Feil, Moira/Fischer, Susanne/Haidvogel, Andreas/Zimmer, Melanie 2008: Bad Guys, Good 
Guys or Something in Between? Corporate Governance Contributions in Zones of 
Violent Conflict, PRIF Report No. 84, Frankfurt am Main: HSFK. 
Financial Times/Pricewaterhouse Cooper 2001: World’s Most Respected Companies – 2001, in: 
http://specials.ft.com/wmr2001/FT3NGL5G6VC.html (6 March 2013). 
Flohr, Annegret/Rieth, Lothar/Schwindenhammer, Sandra/Wolf, Klaus Dieter 2010: The Role 
of Business in Global Governance. Corporations as Norm-Entrepreneurs, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
Fortune 2012: Global 500. Our Annual Ranking of the World’s Largest Corporations, in: 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2012/full_list/ (6 March 2013). 
Fox, Tom/Ward, Halina/Howard, Bruce 2002: Public Sector Roles in Strengthening Corporate 
Social Responsibility: A Baseline Study, Washington, DC: World Bank.  
Franke, Anja/Gawrich, Andrea/Alakbarov, Gurban 2009: Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as Post-
Soviet Rentier States: Resource Incomes and Autocracy as a Double ‘Curse’ in Post-
Soviet Regimes, in: Europe-Asia Studies, 61(1), 109-140. 
Freedom House 2012: Nations in Transit. Azerbaijan, in: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Azerbaijan_final.pdf (6 March 2013). 
Freeman, Edward R. 1984: Strategic Management. A Stakeholder Approach, Boston, MA: 
Pitman. 
Friedman, Milton 1970: The Social Responsibility of Business in to Increase Its Profits, in: New 
York Times Magazine, 13 September 1970.  
Friends of the Earth/Platform/The Corner House 2005: Embracing Autocracy: What They Say 
About BP in Azerbaijan, in: 
http://www.baku.org.uk/publications/Embracing_Autocracy.pdf (6 March 2013). 
Frynas, Jedrzej George 2009: Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Oil Multinationals and 
Social Challenges, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Frynas, Jedrzej George 2003: Royal Dutch/Shell, in: New Political Economy, 8(2), 275-285. 
Frynas, Jedrzej George 2000: Oil in Nigeria. Conflict and Litigation between Oil Companies and 
Village Communities, Hamburg: LIT.  
Fuchs, Doris 2007: Business Power in Global Governance, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Fuchs, Doris 2005: Commanding Heights? The Strength and Fragility of Business Power in 
Global Politics, in: Millennium, 33(3), 771-801. 
Gahramanova, Aytan 2007: Peace Strategies in „Frozen“ Ethno-territorial Conflicts: Integrating 
Reconciliation into Conflict Management. The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh, MZES 
Working Papers, No. 107, Mannheim: MZES.  
Ganser, Daniele 2004: Brauchen wir eine Ökonomie des Friedens? Eine Schweizer Perspektive 
auf die Verbindung der Wirtschaft mit Gewaltkonflikten, in: Die Friedenswarte, 79(1/2), 
57-74. 
Ganson, Brian/Wennmann, Achim 2012: Action Framework for Risk Mitigation and Conflict 
Prevention in the Context of Large-scale Business Investments, Background Note 1, in: 
http://www.fes-
globalization.org/geneva/documents/2012_11_09%20Background%20Note%201%20-
%20Action%20Framework.pdf (6 March 2013).  
Garvey, Niamh/Newell, Peter 2005: Corporate Accountability to the Poor? Assessing the 
Effectiveness of Community-Based Strategies, in: Development in Practice, 15(3/4), 389-
404. 
George, Alexander L./Bennett, Andrew 2005: Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
50 
 
German, Tracey 2012: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia: 
Security Issues in the Caucasus, in: Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 32(2), 216-229. 
Gereffi, Gary/Mayer, Frederick W. 2004: The Demand for Global Governance, Terry Sanford 
Institute of Public Policy Working Paper Series, SAN04-02, Durham, NC: Duke 
University.  
Gerring, John 2004: What Is a Case Study? And What Is It Good For?, in: American Political 
Science Review, 98(2), 341-354. 
Geukjian, Ohannes 2012: Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in the South Caucasus. Nagorno-
Karabakh and the Legacy of Soviet Nationalities Policy, Farnham: Ashgate. 
Global Witness 1999: A Crude Awakening. The Role of the Oil and Banking Industries in 
Angola's Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets, Washington, DC: Global Witness. 
Global Witness 1998: A Rough Trade. The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan 
Conflict, Washington, DC: Global Witness. 
Gosden, Emily 2012: Azerbaijan Threatens BP with ‘Serious Measures’ over Oil Revenue 
Shortfall, in: The Telegraph [online], 11 October 2012, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/9603038/Azerbaijan-
threatens-BP-with-serious-measures-over-oil-revenue-shortfall.html (6 March 2013). 
Green Alternative, National Ecological Centre of Ukraine/CEE Bankwatch Network/Campagna 
per la riforma della Banca mondiale/Platform/Friends of the Earth US/Bank 
Information Center/Ilisu Dam Campaign/The Corner House/Kurdish Human Rights 
Project 2002: International Fact Finding Mission Preliminary Report. Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Turkey Pipelines Project. Azerbaijan Section, in: 
http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecornerhouse.org.uk/files/pipelines-
factfinding-georgia.pdf (6 March 2013). 
Gulbrandsen, Lars H./Moe, Arild 2007: BP in Azerbaijan: A Test Case of the Potential and 
Limits of the CSR Agenda, in: Third World Quarterly, 28(4), 813-830. 
Hall, Peter A. 2003: Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research, in: Mahoney, 
James/Rueschemeyer, Dietrich (eds): Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social 
Sciences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 373-404. 
Haller, Tobias/Blöchlinger, Annja/John, Markus/Marthaler, Esther/Ziegler, Sabine (eds) 2007: 
Fossil Fuels, Oil Companies, and Indigenous Peoples. Strategies of Multinational Oil 
Companies, States, and Ethnic Minorities. Impact on Environment, Livelihoods, and 
Cultural Change, Zürich: LIT. 
Haufler, Virginia 2010: Corporations in Zones of Conflict: Issues, Actors, and Institutions, in: 
Avant, Deborah D./Finnemore, Martha/Sell, Susan K. (eds): Who Governs the Globe?, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 102-130.  
Haufler, Virginia 2001a: A Public Role for the Private Sector. Industry Self-Regulation in a 
Global Economy, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
Haufler, Virginia 2001b: Is There a Role for Business in Conflict Management?, in: Crocker, 
Chester A./Hampson, Fen Osler/Aal, Pamela (eds): Turbulent Peace. The Challenges of 
Managing International Conflict, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 659-
675.  
Haufler, Virginia 1999: Self-regulation and Business Norms: Political Risk, Political Activism, in: 
Cutler, Claire A./Haufler, Virginia/Porter, Tony (eds): Private Authority and 
International Affairs, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 199-123. 
Hazen, Jennifer M./Horner, Jonas 2007: Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria, 
The Niger Delta in Perspective, Occasional Paper Series, No. 20, Geneva: Small Arms 
Survey. 
Heap, Simon 2000: NGOs Engaging with Business – A world of Difference and a Difference to 
the World, Oxford: INTRAC. 
Herbst, Jeffrey 1996: Is Nigeria a Viable State?, in: The Washington Quarterly, 19(2), 151-172. 
51 
 
Héritier, Adrienne/Lehmkuhl, Dirk 2008: The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of 
Governance, in: Journal of Public Policy, 28(1), 1-17. 
HIIK (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research) 2012: Conflict Barometer 2011. 
Disputes, Non-violent Crises, Violent Crises, Limited Wars, Wars, Heidelberg: HIIK. 
Hofferberth, Matthias/Brühl, Tanja/Burkart, Eric/Fey, Marco/Peltner, Anne 2011: 
Multinational Enterprises as “Social Actors” – Constructivist Explanations for Corporate 
Social Responsibility, in: Global Society, 25(2), 205-226. 
Hönke, Jana 2012: Multinationals and Security Governance in the Community: Participation, 
Discipline and Indirect Rule, in: Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 6(1), 57-73. 
Hook, Jacob/Ganguly, Jacob 2000: Multinational Corporations and Ethnic Conflict. Theory and 
Experience, in: Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 6(1), 47-71. 
Human Rights Watch 2005: Azerbaijan Elections and After, Human Rights Watch Briefing 
Paper, November 18, 2005, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch. 
Human Rights Watch 2004: Crushing Dissent: Repression, Violence and Azerbaijan’s Elections, 
Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch. 
Human Rights Watch 2001: The Oil Diagnostic in Angola: An Update, Washington, DC: Human 
Rights Watch. 
Human Rights Watch 1999: The Price of Oil. Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights 
Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities, Washington, DC: Human Rights 
Watch. 
Humphreys, Macarthan 2005: Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering 
the Mechanism, in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49(4), 508-537. 
Ibeanu, Okey/Luckham, Robin 2007: Nigeria: Political Violence, Governance and Corporate 
Responsibility in a Petro-State, in: Kaldor, Mary/Karl, Terry Lynn/Said, Yahia (eds): Oil 
Wars, London: Pluto, 41-99. 
Idemudia, Uwafiokun 2011: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Niger Delta Conflict: Issues 
and Prospects, in: Obi, Cyril/Rustad Siri Aas (eds): Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta, 
London: Zed, 167-183. 
Idemudia, Uwafiokun 2010a: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Rentier Nigerian State: 
Rethinking the Role of Government and the Possibility of Corporate Social Development 
in the Niger Delta, in: Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 30(1/2), 131-153.  
Idemudia, Uwafiokun 2010b: Rethinking the Role of Corporate Social Responsibility in the 
Nigerian Oil Conflict: The Limits of CSR, in: Journal of International Development, 
22(7), 833-845. 
Idemudia, Uwafiokun 2009: Oil Extraction and Poverty Reduction in the Niger Delta: A Critical 
Examination of Partnership Initiatives, in: Journal of Business Ethnics, 90(1), 91-116. 
Idemudia, Uwafiokun/Ite, Uwem E. 2006: Demystifying the Niger Delta Conflict: Towards an 
Integrated Explanation, in: Review of African Political Economy, 33(109), 391-406. 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) 2003: Azerbaijan Republic: Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.  
International Alert 2006: Introduction, in: Banfield, Jessica/Gündüz, Canan/Killick, Nick (eds): 
Local Business, Local Peace: The Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector, 
London: International Alert, 16-35. 
International Alert 2004: Oil and the Search for Peace in the South Caucasus: The Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline, London: International Alert.  
International Crisis Group 2012: Curbing Violence in Nigeria (I): The Jos Crisis, Africa Report 
N° 196, Brussels: International Crisis Group. 
International Crisis Group 2011: Armenia and Azerbaijan: Preventing War, Europe Briefing N° 
60, Tbilisi: International Crisis Group.  
International Crisis Group 2010a: Azerbaijan. Vulnerable Stability, Europe Report N°207, Baku: 
International Crisis Group. 
52 
 
International Crisis Group 2010b: Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict, Africa Report N° 
168, Brussels: International Crisis Group. 
International Crisis Group 2009: Nigeria: Seizing the Moment in the Niger Delta, Africa Briefing 
N° 60, Abuja: International Crisis Group. 
International Crisis Group 2008: Nigeria: Ogoni Land after Shell, Africa Briefing N° 54, Dakar: 
International Crisis Group.  
International Crisis Group 2007: Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War, Europe Report N°187, 
Tbilisi: International Crisis Group. 
Ismailzade, Fariz 2005: The Geopolitics of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, in: Global Dialogue, 
7(3/4), n.p. 
Ite, Uwem E. 2007: Changing Times and Strategies: Shell’s Contribution to Sustainable 
Community Development in the Niger Delta, Nigeria, in: Sustainable Development, 
15(1), 1-14. 
IYC (Ijaw Youth Council) 1998: The Kaiama Declaration, 11 December 1998, in: 
http://www.unitedijaw.com/kaiama.htm#Kaiama (6 March 2013). 
Jamali, Dima/Mirshak, Ramez 2010: Business-Conflict Linkages: Revisiting MNCs, CSR, and 
Conflict, in: Journal of Business Ethics, 93(3), 443-464. 
Jensen, Nathan/Wantchekon, Leonard 2004: Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa, 
in: Comparative Political Studies, 37(7), 816-841. 
Jung, Dietrich 2003: Introduction. Towards Global Civil War?, in: Jung, Dietrich (ed.): Shadow 
Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars. A Political Economy of Intra-State War, 
London: Routledge, 1-6. 
Kaldor, Mary 2007: Oil and Conflict: The Case of Nagorno Karabakh, in: Kaldor, Mary/Karl, 
Terry Lynn/Said, Yahia (eds): Oil Wars, London: Pluto, 41-99. 
Kaldor, Mary 1999: New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press.  
Kamrava, Mehran 2001: State-Building in Azerbaijan: The Search for Consolidation, in: Middle 
East Journal, 55(2), 216-236. 
Keck, Margaret E./Sikkink, Kathryn 1998: Activists Beyond Borders. Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
Keen, David 1998: The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Papers, No. 320, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
King, Gary/Keohane, Robert O./Verba, Sidney 1994: Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Korten, David C. 2001: When Corporations Rule the World, 2nd edition, San Francisco, 
CA/Bloomfield, CT: Berret-Koehler/Kumarian Press.  
Lallemand, Alain 2002: Drugs, Diamonds and Deadly Cargoes, in: Van Niekerk, Phillip (ed.): 
Making a Killing, http://www.publicintegrity.org/2002/11/18/5697/drugs-diamonds-
and-deadly-cargoes (6 March 2013), Washington, DC: Center for Public Integrity. 
Le Billon, Philippe 2001: The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict, 
in: Political Geography, 20(5), 561-584. 
Luciani, Giacomo 1987: Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework, in: Beblawi, 
Hazem/Luciani, Giacomo (eds): The Rentier State, London: Croom Helm, 63-82.  
Macalister, Terry 2003: Amnesty Calls for Action on Caspian, in: The Guardian [online], 20 May 
2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2003/may/20/oilandpetrol.news (6 March 
2013). 
Mähler, Annegret 2012: An Inescapable Curse? Resource Management, Violent Conflict, and 
Peacebuilding in the Niger Delta, in: Lujala, Päivi/Rustad, Siri Aas (eds): High-Value 
Natural Resources and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Abingdon: Earthscan, 391-412. 
Mähler, Annegret 2010: Nigeria: A Prime Example of the Resource Curse? Revisiting the Oil-
Violence Link in the Niger Delta, GIGA Working Papers, No. 120, Hamburg: GIGA. 
53 
 
Mansley, Mark 2003: The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline and BP: A Financial Analysis. Building 
Tomorrow’s Crisis?, London: Platform. 
Mathews, Jessica T. 1997: Power Shift, in: Foreign Affairs, 76(1), 50-66. 
Mayntz, Renate 2010: Governance im modernen Staat, in: Benz, Arthur/Dose, Nicolai (eds): 
Governance – Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen. Eine Einführung, 2nd edition, 
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 37-48. 
McNamee, Mark 2012: Have the Niger Delta's MEND Militants Resumed Operations in 
Southern Nigeria?, in: Terrorism Monitor, 10(4), 6-8. 
Meissner, Hannes 2010: The Resource Curse and Rentier States in the Caspian Region: A Need 
for Context Analysis, GIGA Working Papers, No. 133, Hamburg: GIGA. 
Merry, E. Wayne 2013: Another Regional War in the Wings, in: The National Interest, 31 January 
2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/another-regional-war-the-wings-8042 (6 
March 2013). 
Messner, Dirk 1999: Globalisierung, Global Governance und Entwicklungspolitik, in: 
Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 1999(1), 5-18.  
Mill, Stuart [1884]: A System of Logic. Ratiocinative and Inductive. Being a Connected View of 
the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation, reprinted edition, 
London: George Routledge and Sons.  
Molchanov, Mikhail A. 2011: Extractive Technologies and Civic Networks’ Fight for Sustainable 
Development, in: Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 31(1), 55-67. 
MOSOP (Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta) 1990: Ogoni Bill of Rights, 
October 1990, in: http://www.mosop.org/Ogoni_Bill_of_Rights_1990.pdf (6 March 
2013), Port Harcourt: MOSOP. 
Mühle, Ursula 2010: The Politics of Corporate Social Responsibility. The Rise of a Global 
Business Norm, Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag. 
Müller, Harald 2003: Begriff, Theorien und Praxis des Friedens, in: Hellermann, Gunther/Wolf, 
Klaus Dieter/Zürn, Michael (eds): Die neuen Internationalen Beziehungen. 
Forschungsstand und Perspektiven aus Deutschland, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 209-250. 
Müller-Debus, Anna Kristin/Thauer, Christian R./Börzel, Tanja A. 2009: Governing HIV/AIDS 
in South Africa. The Role of Firms, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, No. 20, 
Berlin: DFG Research Center (SFB) 700, Freie Universität Berlin.  
Münkler, Herfried 2002: Die neuen Kriege, Reinbek: Rowohlt. 
Muttitt, Greg/Marriott, James 2002: Some Common Concerns. Imagining BP’s Azerbaijan-
Georgia-Turkey Pipelines System, London: Platform/The Corner House/Friends of the 
Earth International/Campagna per la Riforma della Banca Mondiale/CEE Bankwatch 
Network/The Kurdish Human Rights Project. 
Nelson, Jane 2000: The Business of Peace. The Private Sector as a Partner in Conflict Prevention 
and Resolution, London: International Alert/International Business Leaders 
Forum/Council on Economic Priorities.  
Newman Edward 2004: The ‚New Wars’ Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed, in: Security 
Dialogue, 35(2), 173-189.  
Nwachukwu, Clara/Umoru, Henry/Erunke, Joseph 2013: Dutch Court Finds Shell Guilty of Oil 
Pollution in Nigeria, in: Vanguard [online], 31 January 2013, 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/01/dutch-court-finds-shell-guilty-of-oil-pollution-
in-nigeria/ (6 March 2013). 
Obi, Cyril 2009: Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Violent Oil-
related Conflict, in: Africa Development, 34(2), 103-128. 
Oboreh, Jacob 2010: The Origins and the Causes of Crisis in the Niger Delta: The Way Forward, 
in: Ojakorotu, Victor (ed.): Anatomy of the Niger Delta Crisis. Causes, Consequences and 
Opportunities for Peace, Mu  nster: LIT, 17-35. 
54 
 
Oetzel, Jennifer/Getz, Kathleen A./Ladek, Stephen 2007: The Role of Multinational Enterprises 
in Responding to Violent Conflict: A Conceptual Model and Framework for Research, in: 
American Business Law Journal, 44(2), 331-358. 
Oliviero, Melanie B./Simmons, Adele 2002: Who’s Minding the Store? Global Civil Society and 
Corporate Responsibility, in: Glasius, Marlies/Kaldor, Mary/Anheier, Helmut (eds): 
Global Civil Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 77-108.  
Omeje, Kenneth 2006: High Stakes and Stakeholders. Oil Conflict and Security in Nigeria, 
Aldershot: Ashgate.  
Panke, Diana 2004: How to Combine Rationalist and Constructivist Accounts of International 
Politics. Building Bridges on Terra Firma, in: http://userpage.fu-
berlin.de/~europe/team/PankeD/panke_2005c.pdf (6 March 2013), Berlin: Freie 
Universität Berlin. 
Pegg, Scott 2006: World Leaders and Bottom Feeders: Divergent Strategies Toward Social 
Responsibility and Resource Extraction, in: May, Christopher (ed.): Global Corporate 
Power, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 249-269. 
Pegg, Scott 1999: The Cost of Doing Business: Transnational Corporations and Violence in 
Nigeria, in: Security Dialogue, 30(4), 473-484. 
Prandi, Maria/Lozano, Joesp M. 2011: Introduction, in: Prandi, Maria/Lozano, Josep M. (eds): 
CSR in Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments: From Risk Management to Value 
Creation, Bellaterra/Barcelona: Escola de Cultura de Pau, Universidad Autònoma de 
Barcelona/Instituto de Innovación Social (ESADE), Universidad de Ramón Llul, 9-13. 
Reinicke, Wolfgang H. 1997: Global Public Policy, in: Foreign Affairs, 76(6), 127-138. 
Renner, Michael 2002: The Anatomy of Resource Wars, Worldwatch Papers, No. 162, 
Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute. 
Republic of Azerbaijan/Republic of Georgia/Republic of Turkey/BTC Co. 2003: Joint 
Statement on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project, 16 May 2003, in: 
http://subsites.bp.com/caspian/Joint%20Statement.pdf (6 March 2013). 
Rettberg, Angelika 2011: Private Sector Participation in Peace-Building: Taking Stock and 
Identifying Some Lessons, in: Prandi, Maria/Lozano, Josep M. (eds): CSR in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Environments: From Risk Management to Value Creation, 
Bellaterra/Barcelona: Escola de Cultura de Pau, Universidad Autònoma de 
Barcelona/Instituto de Innovación Social (ESADE), Universidad de Ramón Llul, 89-96. 
Rice, David 2002: Human Rights Strategies for Corporations, in: Business Ethnics, 11(2), 134-
136. 
Rieth, Lothar/Zimmer, Melanie 2004a: Transnational Corporations and Conflict Prevention: The 
Impact of Norms on Private Actors, Tu  binger Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik 
und Friedensforschung, No. 43, Tu  bingen: Universität Tu bingen. 
Rieth, Lothar/Zimmer, Melanie 2004b: Unternehmen der Rohstoffindustrie. Möglichkeiten und 
Grenzen der Konfliktprävention, in: Die Friedenswarte, 79(1/2), 75-101. 
Risse, Thomas 2008: Regieren in “Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit”: Zur Reisefähigkeit des 
Governance-Konzeptes, in: Schuppert, Gunnar Folke/Zürn, Michael (eds): Governance 
in einer sich wandelnden Welt, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonderheft 41,Wiesbaden: 
VS Verlag, 149-170. 
Risse, Thomas/Leibfried, Stephan 2011: Wie viel Staat braucht Governance? Ein kritischer 
Kommentar, in: Beisheim, Marianne/Börzel, Tanja A./Genschel, Philipp/Zangl, 
Bernhard (eds): Wozu Staat? Governance in Räumen begrenzter und konsolidierter 
Staatlichkeit, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 267-279. 
Rittberger, Volker 2004: Transnationale Unternehmen in Gewaltkonflikten, in: Die 
Friedenswarte, 79(1/2), 15-34. 
Rosenau, James N./Czempiel, Ernst-Otto (eds.) 1992: Governance without Government: Order 
and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
55 
 
Rosenau, William/Chalk, Peter/McPherson, Renny/Parker, Michelle/Long, Austin 2009: 
Corporations and Counterinsurgency, Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 
Ruggie, John Gerard 2002: The Theory and Practice of Learning Networks. Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Global Compact, in: Journal of Corporate Citizenship, 5, 27-36. 
Rustad, Siri Aas/Lujala, Päivi/Le Billon, Philippe 2012: Building or Spoiling Peace? Lessons from 
the Management of High-Value Natural Resources, in: Lujala, Päivi/Rustad, Siri Aas 
(eds): High-Value Natural Resources and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, Abingdon: 
Earthscan, 571-621. 
Sachs, Jeffery/Warner, Andrew 1995: Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth, 
NBER Working Papers, No. 5398, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Sahara Reporters 2007: We Will Soon Stop Nigerian Oil Exports – Jomo Gbomo, Interview with 
Jomo Gbomo, in: Sahara Reporters, 30 March 2007, 
http://saharareporters.com/interview/we-will-soon-stop-nigerian-oil-export-—jomo-
gbomo (6 March 2013).  
Schmidt, Claudia 1991: Das Konzept des Rentier-Staates. Ein sozialwissenschaftliches Paradigma 
zur Analyse von Entwicklungsgesellschaften und seine Bedeutung für den Vorderen 
Orient, Münster: LIT. 
Shankleman, Jill 2006: Oil, Profits, and Peace. Does Business Have a Role in Peacemaking?, 
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.  
Shaxson, Nicholas 2009: Nigeria’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Just a Glorious 
Audit?, London: Chatham House. 
Shell 2012a: Global Memorandum of Understanding, in: 
http://www.shell.com.ng/content/dam/shell/static/nga/downloads/pdfs/briefing-
notes/gmou-2012.pdf (6 March 2013). 
Shell 2012b: Press Release. Rising Crude Theft Activities Threaten Daily Export of 140,000 
Barrels of Oil, 6 February 2012, in: http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/media-
centre/news-and-media-releases/2012/rising-crude-theft.html (6 March 2013). 
Shell 2012c: Sustainability Report. Royal Dutch Shell Plc Sustainability Report 2011, in: 
http://reports.shell.com/sustainability-
report/2011/servicepages/downloads/files/entire_shell_sr11.pdf (6 March 2013). 
Shell 2012d: The Operating Environment, in: http://s09.static-
shell.com/content/dam/shell/static/nga/downloads/pdfs/briefing-notes/operating-
env.pdf (6 March 2013).  
Shell 2011: Shell in Nigeria. Working in a Complex Environment, July 21st 2011, Session 1 
Transcript, in: 
http://www.shelldialogues.com/sites/default/files/Nigeria%20Webchat%20-
%20July%202011%20-%20Session%201.pdf (6 March 2013). 
Shell 2010: Sustainability Report. Royal Dutch Shell Plc Sustainability Report 2009, in: 
http://reports.shell.com/sustainability-
report/2009/servicepages/downloads/files/all_shell_sr09.pdf (6 March 2013). 
Shell 2009: Doing Business in Nigeria: Challenges and Questions, July 23rd 2009, Session 
Transcript, in: 
http://www.shelldialogues.com/sites/default/files/NigeriatranscriptV2_0.pdf (6 March 
2013). 
Shell 2007: Shell Nigeria Annual Report 2006. People and the Environment, in: 
http://narcosphere.narconews.com/userfiles/70/2006_shell_nigeria_report.pdf (6 March 
2013). 
Shell 1998: The Shell Report 1998. Profits and Principles – Does There Have to Be a Choice?, in: 
http://reports.shell.com/sustainability-
report/2010/servicepages/previous/files/shell_report_1998.pdf (6 March 2013). 
56 
 
Shell 1997: Statement of General Business Principles, in: http://www.shell.com/static/myen/ 
downloads/sd2002/sgbp.pdf (6 March 2013). 
Shell 1995: Clear Thinking in Troubled Times, Advertisement, in: The Observer, 19 November 
1995.  
Shell n.d.a: Human Rights, in: http://www.shell.com.ng/environment-society/safety-
tpkg/upholding-human-rights.html (6 March 2013). 
Shell n.d.b: Shell at a Glance, in: http://www.shell.com.ng/aboutshell/at-a-glance.html (6 March 
2013). 
Shell n.d.c: The Operating Environment, in: 
http://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/297249/the-operating-environment/2 (6 
March 2013). 
Simons, Penelope 2004: Corporate Voluntarism and Human Rights. The Adequacy and 
Efficiency of Voluntary Self-Regulation Regimes, in: Relations industrielles/Industrial 
Relations, 59(1), 101-141.  
Skjærseth, Jon Birger/Tangen, Kristian/Swanson, Philip/Christiansen, Atle Christer/Moe, 
Arild/Lunde, Leiv 2004: Limits to Corporate Social Responsibility: A Comparative Study 
of Four Major Oil Companies, FNI Report, No. 7/2004, Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen 
Institute. 
Smillie, Ian/Gberie, Lansana/Hazleton, Ralph 2000: The Heart of the Matter. Sierra Leone. 
Diamonds and Human Security, Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada. 
Smith, Dan 2004: Trends and Causes of Armed Conflict, in: Austin, Alex/Fischer, Martina/ 
Ropers, Norbert (eds): Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict, The Berghof Handbook, 
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 111-127.  
Smith, Gare A. 2008: Human Rights and Security External Monitoring Assessment of the AGT 
Pipeline Projects in Azerbaijan. BTC and SCP Pipeline Projects, in: 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/bp_caspian/bp_caspian_en/STAGING/loc
al_assets/downloads_pdfs/f/VP_Report_2008.pdf (6 March 2013). 
Smith, Gare A. 2006: Human Rights and Security External Monitoring Assessment of the AGT 
Pipeline Projects in Azerbaijan. BTC and SCP Pipeline Projects, in: 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/bp_caspian/bp_caspian_en/STAGING/loc
al_assets/downloads_pdfs/f/FH_Az_Vol_Princ_Assess_Final_en.pdf (6 March 2013). 
Smith, Gare A. 2004: The BTC Pipeline Case Study: Following Through on Global Compact 
Commitments, in: UNGC/OHCHR (eds): Embedding Human Rights Into Business 
Practice, New York, NY: UNGC, 69-79. 
Spar, Debora L./La Mure, Lane T. 2003: The Power of Activism: Assessing the Impact of NGOs 
on Global Business, in: California Management Review, 45(3), 78-101. 
Steiner, Richard 2010: Double Standard. Shell Practices in Nigeria Compared with International 
Standards to Prevent and Control Pipeline Oil Spills and the Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Spill, Amsterdam: Friends of the Earth. 
Strange, Susan 1996: The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Sultanova, Shahla 2012: Azerbaijan: Does Baku Face Evolving Opposition?, in: Eurasianet, 25 
October 2012, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66111 (6 March 2013). 
Swanson, Philip 2002: Fuelling Conflict. The Oil Industry and Armed Conflict, Oslo: Fafo 
Institute for Applied Social Science. 
Taylor, Mark 2002: Emerging Conclusions. March 2002. Economies of Conflict: Private Sector 
Activity in Armed Conflict, Oslo: Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science. 
The Guardian 2010: US Embassy Cables: Azerbaijan President Threatens to Put BP Boss ‘on 
Trial’, in: The Guardian [online], 15 December 2010, 





UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) 2012: Transnational 
Corporations (TNC), in: http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Transnational-
corporations-(TNC).aspx (6 March 2013). 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) 2011a: Web Table 34. 
Number of Parent Corporations and Foreign Affiliates, by Region and Economy, 2010, 
in: http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/WIR11_web%20tab%2034.pdf (6 
March 2013).  
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) 2011b: World Investment 
Report 2011. Non-equity Modes of International Production and Development, Geneva: 
UNCTAD. 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) 1993: World Investment 
Report 1993. Transnational Corporations and Integrated International Production, 
Geneva: UNCTAD. 
UNGC (United Nations Global Compact) 2007: UN Global Compact. Annual Review. 2007 
Leaders Summit, New York, NY: United Nations Global Compact Office.  
UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization)/Microsoft 2008: Working 
Together to Enable Innovation, Jobs & Opportunity, in: 
http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Services/PSD/microsoft_Partnership.pdf 
(6 March 2013).  
USAID (United States Agency for International Development) 2004: Minerals and Conflict. A 
Toolkit for Intervention, Washington, DC: USAID. 
Utting, Peter 2005: Corporate Responsibility and the Movement of Business, in: Development in 
Practice, 15(3/4), 375-388. 
Utting, Peter/Ives, Kate 2006: The Politics of Corporate Responsibility and the Oil Industry, in: 
St Anthony’s International Review, 2(1), 11-34. 
Van Evera, Stephen 1997: Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press. 
Van Niekerk 2002: Making a Killing. The Business of War, in: Van Niekerk, Phillip (ed.): Making 
a Killing, http://www.publicintegrity.org/2002/10/28/5664/making-killing (6 March 
2013), Washington, DC: Center for Public Integrity. 
Vogel, David 2005: The Market for Virtue. The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.  
VP (Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights) 2013: Voluntary Principles Timeline, in: 
http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/timeline/ (6 March 2013). 
Wallbott, Lisa 2010: Calling on Peace: The International ICT Sector and the Conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, in: Deitelhoff, Nicole/Wolf, Klaus Dieter (eds): 
Corporate Security Responsibility? Corporate Governance Contributions to Peace and 
Security in Zones of Conflict, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 85-105. 
Watts, Michael 2008: Anatomy of an Oil Insurgency: Violence and Militants in the Niger Delta, 
Nigeria, in: Omeje, Kenneth (ed.): Extractive Economies and Conflicts in the Global 
South. Multi-Regional Perspectives on Rentier Politics, Aldershot: Ashgate, 51-74. 
Watts, Michael 2005: Righteous Oil? Human Rights, the Oil Complex, and Corporate Social 
Responsibility, in: Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 30(1), 373-407. 
Webb, Toby/Carstens, Meg 2008: Corporations, Institutions and Better Governance, London: 
Ethical Corporation Institute. 
Wenger, Andreas/Möckli, Daniel 2003: Conflict Prevention. The Untapped Potential of the 
Business Sector, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.  
Wolf, Klaus Dieter 2010: Chartered Companies: Linking Private Security Governance in Early 
and Post Modernity, in: Deitelhoff, Nicole/Wolf, Klaus Dieter (eds.): Corporate Security 
Responsibility? Corporate Governance Contributions to Peace and Security in Zones of 
Conflict, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 154-176. 
58 
 
Wolf, Klaus Dieter/Deitelhoff, Nicole/Engert, Stefan 2007: Corporate Security Responsibility: 
Towards a Conceptual Framework for a Comparative Research Agenda, in: Cooperation 
and Conflict 42(3), 294-320. 
Wolf, Klaus Dieter/Schwindenhammer, Sandra 2011: Vom Business Case zum Public Case? Der 
Beitrag privater Selbstregulierung zu Global Governance, in: Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- 
und Unternehmensethik, 12(1), 10-28.  
World Bank 2009: Azerbaijan Country Economic Memorandum. A New Silk Road: Export-led 
Diversification, Report No. 44365-AZ, in: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AZERBAIJANEXTN/Resources/Azerbaijan_CEM
_FINAL.pdf (6 March 2013). 
Yates, Douglas 1996: The Rentier State in Africa: Oil Rent Dependency and Neocolonialism in 
the Republic of Gabon, Asmara: Africa World Press. 
Zalik, Anna 2009: Zones of Exclusion: Offshore Extraction, the Contestation of Space and 
Physical Displacement in the Nigerian Delta and the Mexican Gulf, in: Antipode, 41(3), 
557-582. 
Zimmer, Melanie 2010: Oil Companies in Nigeria: Emerging Good Practice or Still Fuelling 
Conflict?, in: Deitelhoff, Nicole/Wolf, Klaus Dieter (eds): Corporate Security 
Responsibility? Corporate Governance Contributions to Peace and Security in Zones of 
Conflict, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 58-84. 
Zinecker, Heidrun 2011: Civil Society in Developing Countries. Conceptual Considerations, in: 






Figure 1: Map of the Niger Delta 
 
 
Source: International Crisis Group 2009: Nigeria: Seizing the Moment in the Niger Delta, Africa Briefing 
























Figure 2: Map of Nagorno-Karabakh 
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Figure 3: Map of BP-operated pipelines and related projects 
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